The Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia, part 2 (WW II)

[From the book “Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia) by Evangelos Kofos, Institute for Balkan Studies, pages 102-107]

Occupation in Western Macedonia

From the first days of the occupation, the Bulgarians indicated that they would not be satisfied with Eastern Macedonia only. Their objectives included the acquisition of the Central and Western parts of Greek Ma­cedonia with the port of Thessaloniki. Western and Central Macedonia constituted the lifeline not only of the German forces in Greece, but also of the German divisions fighting in Northern Africa. It was understand­able, therefore, that the Germans would entrust neither to their Italian nor to their Bulgarian allies the administration of the vital port of Thessalo­niki and the Vardar (Axios) Valley. Only some remote parts of Western Macedonia were included in the Italian zone of occupation.

The Bulgarians, on the other hand, were determined to extend their control to those regions by any means. The fact that in this area lived appro­ximately 80,000 Slav-speaking inhabitants of whom a large segment had at the time of the German invasion, openly shown pro-Bulgarian sentiments, provided a further inducement and an excuse. On the whole, these Slav-speaking inhabitants had settled peacefully in the country and were it not for the Axis invasion and Bulgarian propaganda reviving in many old Bul­garian sympathies, they would have gradually been assimilated by the more populous Greek-speaking element.[1]

It was easy for the Bulgarians to persecute, evict or take as hostages thousands of Greeks from that part of Macedonia which was under their jurisdiction, but in German-occupied Western Macedonia, they needed to enlist the support of at least the Slavophones who were by no means en­tirely sympathetic to them. They had also to convince the Germans that Western Macedonia was heavily inhabited by Bulgarians; a very ambitious task, indeed.

The first objective, i.e. the proselytization of the Slavophones, had started even during the course of the Greco-Italian war when the Bulga­rians succeeded in obtaining from Italy special treatment for Greek pri­soners of war from Macedonia who were willing to declare themselves Bulgarians. [2]

The collapse of the Greek front in Macedonia before the onrushing German divisions created a psychological uneasiness among the inhabitants of the region. Militant Bulgarian-sympathisers waged a war of nerves against the native Greek population through the arrogant display of Bulgarian flags, and rumors that momentarily the Bulgarian Army would oc­cupy Western Macedonia. [3]

From May through July 1941, the situation worsened. The Greek Gendarmerie and officials of the local administration had followed the retreating army to the south. A number of Bulgarian sympathizers took advantage of the situation to form armed bands and terrorize the Greek population. The situation remained unchanged until July when the Greek authorities were allowed by the Germans to return to the region. [4]

The Bulgarians countered with a better organized, long-range plan to acquire control of the area. With the consent of the Germans, they estab­lished in Thessaloniki a Bulgarian Association which was founded osten­sibly, "for the cultural advancement and mutual assistance of its mem­bers." In fact, it became the center of Bulgarian efforts to seize Greek Western Macedonia through propaganda and, later, through coercion.

According to its Statute [5] (Article 4), only Bulgarians who were born in Macedonia, or Bulgarians of Macedonian origin could be admitted to the Association. Identity cards were issued for the members entitling them to special privileges and rich food rations, [6] a determining factor in sway­ing the loyalties of needy peasants in famine-stricken Macedonia. The Statute was confirmed on October 26, 1941, by General Von Krensky, German Commander of Thessaloniki and the Aegean, under condition that only Bulgarian citizens or Greeks of Bulgarian nationality could be admit­ted to membership. Furthermore, it was stipulated that the Association would be subjected to the laws of the German-installed Greek Government. It is interesting to note that it explicitly prohibited any financial advant­ages to the members, [7] a clause which was never observed.

The Greek Government in Athens strongly protested the establish­ment of this Bulgarian center in Thessaloniki. In a long memorandum to the Reich authorities in Greece, dated October 16, 1941, the Prime Minister complained that agents of the Bulgarian Association did not confine them­selves to conducting propaganda but were engaged in acts of terrorism against the Greek population. In addition, the Prime Minister contended that leading Bulgarian agents were communists as were most of the re­cruited and secretly armed peasants. Indicative of the aims of the Bulga-rians, said the Prime Minister, was the discovery by the German authori­ties in a village of Fiorina of concealed weapons which were enough to arm a whole battalion. [8]

The Germans failed to take any definite action on the basis of of­ficial Greek complaints, to curtail the discrepancies of the Bulgarians. This prompted the Bulgarians to adopt even more aggressive measures. Liaison officers were appointed to the German military headquarters in Thessalo­niki and other cities. They soon became agents of an ambitious plan aimed at convincing the Germans that Western Macedonia was inhabited mostly by Bulgarians. [9] The Bulgarians tried also to expand their influence to the monastery community of Mount Athos. In February 1942, reports reached the Athens Government that the few Bulgarian monks of Mount Athos, apparently on instructions by the Bulgarian Government, were engaged in an effort to secure an order from the Germans for the eviction of the Greek authorities. Their plan aimed at internationalizing the monastery community—long the cradle of Orthodoxy in the Balkans—as a first step toward its subjection to Bulgarian control [ 10]

The Germans, although they condoned the Bulgarian activities in German-occupied Macedonia, did not seem to consent to the Bulgarian demand to extend their authority into other regions as well. This German attitude convinced the Bulgarians that to succeed in their plans they had to rely on their own efforts. Thus, they were able to be entrusted with the distribution of foodstuffs donated by the International Red Cross. They declared that only those signing up as Bulgarians would receive food ra­tions. However, even this method failed to produce impressive results as only 14,709 persons were given Bulgarian identity cards [11]

The failure of the food distribution plan caused the Bulgarians to adopt more stringent methods. Through their liaison officers they succeed­ed in organizing and secretly arming their followers in the Western Macedonian districts. The German authorities were aware of the Bulga­rian activities, but they were not inclined to take drastic measures against their allies.

As the situation deteriorated further, the Athens Government was compelled to protest, once again, to the Reich supreme authorities in Greece, in the strongest language permitted. The protest went as far as to accuse the local German authorities of tolerating and sheltering the activities of Bulgarian agents. It is worth quoting extensively from this document:

The present Greek Government, having accepted to govern the country under extremely difficult conditions and circumstances, set out, as one of its primary objectives, the bridging of the chasm —which bad fortune had created between the Greek and the German peoples—, the re-establishment of the long-existing feelings of friend­ship and mutual esteem, and the rapprochement of the Greek peo­ple with the objectives and tendencies of New Germany. [The Go­vernment] finds itself in the difficult position of having to acknow­ledge that its efforts in these directions have not brought the desired results, principally on account of the utterly unpsychological attitude of certain military authorities toward the Bulgarian claims in districts inhabited by crushing majorities of pure Greek populations for which the Greek people have for decades, paid with heavy sacrifices.

The Greek Government... would feel deep gratitude if it were assi­sted in its efforts by the German Government and by its local po­litical and military representatives. [The Government's efforts] would be successfully carried out by the removal from German-occupied Greek Macedonia of every center of Bulgarian propaganda. Such are mainly today the Bulgarian Association of Thessaloniki and the Bulgarian liaison officers attached to the various German city headquarters...[12]

Greek protests, however, had little if any effect. The Bulgarian liai­son officers—among whom a Lieutenant Kaltchev played a major role-continued to organize militarily their followers hoping that eventually they would be invited by the Germans to take over the administration of the region. Bulgarian hopes appeared to have a better chance when Greek partisans began to make their appearance on the mountains of Macedonia. In the Italian administered zone, the authorities permitted the pro-Bulga­rian Slavophones to form armed security units, [13] which were entrusted with the maintenance of “order and peace” [14] It is interesting to note that, from the beginning, these newly-formed security units—popularly known as "Ohrana battalions" [15] —did not receive their orders from the Italian authorities but from the Bulgarian liaison officers. In a short time they became notorious for their persecution of the Greek inhabitants. In the Kastoria region alone, they burned more than forty villages [16]

The Italian Armistice in November 1943, removed a serious obstacle from Bulgaria's efforts to extend her control over most of Greek Macedo­nia. The Germans, engaged in critical combat in both the Eastern and Ita­lian fronts, had neither the units to spare for occupation duty, nor the time to investigate the conduct of their Bulgarian allies in their zone of occupation. In the summer of 1943 they offered them an additional strip of land west of the Strymon river which included most of the Kilkis Prefecture and the northern part of the Thessaloniki Prefecture, including Chalkidiki [17] After the war, at the Sofia trial of the leaders of the wartime Bulgarian government, the Crown Counselor, Jordan Sevov, revealed that the Bulgarian Government had debated at that time whether to extend the zone of occupation to include Thessaloniki. It had failed to reach an agreement primarily on account of the General Staff which rai­sed objections for purely military considerations. [18] Finally, in the closing days of the occupation—late in 1944—the Bulgarians attempted clandes­tinely to extend their military authority into three more districts of Central and Western Macedonia, namely Edessa, Kastoria and Fiorina. This move, which was bound to be short-lived, had no other meaning than to register Bulgarian presence in a Greek region long claimed by the Bulgarians, ap­parently in the remote hope that the course of international developments might allow them to remain in possession of the regions they occupied.

On September 9, the Bulgarian Government was overthrown by the Fatherland Front. However, despite the Government change, the Bulgarians still hoped to remain in the occupied regions on the pretext of fighting the Germans. Stern Allied demarches forced them to leave all Greek lands by late November 1944.

NOTES

[1]- Barker, op. cit., p. 31.
[2]- Following the occupation of Greece, these prisoners of war were transported to Bulgaria and there is evidence to suggest that they were later sent back to Greece to form Bulgarian organizations. Kostas Bramos, Σλαυοκομμουνιστικαι 'Ορ­γανώσεις έν Μακεδονία: Προπαγάνδα και Επαναστατική Δράσις [Communist-Slav Organizations in Macedonia; Propaganda and Revolutionary Activities], First Edi­tion (Thessaloniki: 1954), pp. 102-103.
[3]- Naltsas, op. cit.. p. 217
[4]-Demetrios G. Zapheiropoulos, To KKE και ή Μακεδονία [The KKE andMacedonia], (Athens, 1948), p. 10.
[5]- Statute in GFM, E/1028/VI/1/1941 (File I/3a/1941-1942).
[6]- Ibid.
[7]- Order V5, Volk 4; in GFM, E/1029/VI/1/1941
[8]- No 51, dated October 16, 1941, in GFM, Nr. E/860/VI,3. The evidence was corroborated by a secret report of the Thessaloniki Police which informed the Go­vernment that anarchists and communists were admitted to the Bulgarian Association. GFM, File I/3a'1941-42.
[9]- Confidential report of the Edessa Gendramerie dated August 31, 1941. Text in GFM Archives. Also Naltsas, op. cit., p. 263.
[10]- GFM, "'Prime Minister's File,"' Ε/68, 1/36/1942.
[11]- Bramos, op. cit., [First Edition], p. 105.
[12]- GFM, File No I/3b/1942, Nr. E/595/l/3a/v dated October 23, 1942. In the knowledge of the author, this is the first time that this document is published.
[13]- Naltsas, op. cit., p. 217.
[14]- Zapheiropoulos, op. cit., p. 19.
[15]- "Comments and Oral Statement Made by the Liaison Representative ofGreece on Parts II and III of the Report, 'Memorandum on the Slavophones of Greece', United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 2nd year, Special Supplement, No. 2, Report by the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to the Security Council, Vol. Ill (S/360 Rev. 1; July 28, 1950), (New York, 1950), pp. 323 - 327, [hereafter referred to as "Memorandum on the Slavophones of Greece"].
[16]- Ibid., p. 326
[17]- Petros Monastiriotis, Oi Πρώσσοι των Βαλκανίων [The Prussians of the Balkans], (Cairo : 1944), p. 60.
[18]- Report by the Greek Ambassador to Ankara, dated January 10, 1945, GFM, A/7931/1945.

FOR FAIR USE ONLY

Legality of Veto to NATO Accession: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Sues Greece before the ICJ

By Markos Karavias and Antonios Tzanakopoulos

Introduction
On November 17, 2008, the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYR Macedonia) instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging that Greece’s objection to its application to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) breaches the 1995 Interim Accord between these two States.[1] This is the first time that FYR Macedonia has appeared as a party before the ICJ, and the first time that Greece has appeared before the Court as a respondent.
Background to the Dispute
With the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, some of its constituent federal units, including the Republic of Macedonia, declared independence and sought international recognition. The FYR Macedonia declared its independence on September 17, 1991 following a referendum. The Badinter Commission, established by the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EC Council), recommended that the European Community (EC) accept the Republic of Macedonia’s request for recognition and found that FYR Macedonia had renounced any territorial claims.[2] Greece then blocked EC recognition arguing that Macedonia’s name, flag and a number of provisions in its Constitution implied territorial claims against it.[3] Macedonia is also the name of an administrative region in northern Greece, and a wider geographical region extending over four neighboring States.
This evolved into a dispute involving everything from Security Council resolutions, to unilateral countermeasures in the form of an economic embargo, and to proceedings before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Republic was admitted to membership in the United Nations in 1993 under the provisional name ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’,[4] and most EC member-States considered their affirmative vote in the Security Council and/or the General Assembly to imply the recognition of the new State.
After a first escalation in 1994, which led to embargo measures by Greece and a challenge to these measures by the Commission of the European Communities before the ECJ,[5] the two States concluded an agreement in 1995 on Greece’s recognition of FYR Macedonia, on the establishment of liaison offices and on normalization of economic relations.[6] This ‘Interim Accord’ dealt with everything but the name of the new State, and included an undertaking to continue negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General ‘with a view to reaching agreement on the difference’ that has arisen over the name.[7] The dispute is still ongoing, and the Interim Accord is still in force.
FYR Macedonia’s Application
FYR Macedonia expected to receive an invitation to join NATO during the 2-4 April 2008 Bucharest Summit of NATO. The Bucharest Summit Declaration provided instead that ‘an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached.’[8] FYR Macedonia’s Application to the Court[9] alleges that Greek actions have denied it membership in NATO. This is because an invitation to join the Organization can only be extended by unanimous agreement of all NATO Members.[10] The position taken by Greece in the lead-up to the Bucharest Summit made it clear that Greece opposed the extension of such an invitation. [11]
FYR Macedonia claims that Greece has violated Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord, which provides:

The Party of the First Part agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of the Party of the Second Part in international, multilateral, and regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is a member; however, the Party of the First Part reserves the right to object to any membership referred to above if and to the extent the Party of the Second Part is to be referred to in such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817 (1993).

(To avoid the name issue, this provision refers to Greece and FYR Macedonia as ‘the Party of the First Part’ and ‘the Party of the Second Part’ respectively).
FYR Macedonia claims that it has complied with its obligations under the Interim Accord, but that Greece breached its obligation under Article 11(1) by blocking the invitation to FYR Macedonia to join NATO even though FYR Macedonia applied under its provisional name in accordance with Article 11(1).[12] FYR Macedonia requests the Court to order Greece to cease objecting to its membership to NATO or any other international organization.[13]
Jurisdiction of the Court
Under Article 21(2) of the Interim Accord, ‘[a]ny difference or dispute that arises between the Parties concerning the interpretation or implementation of [the] Interim Accord may be submitted by either of them to the International Court of Justice, except for the difference referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1,’ this being the difference concerning the name. FYR Macedonia relies on Article 21(2) to establish the Court’s jurisdiction. One potential preliminary objection Greece could raise would be based on the assertion that the dispute before the Court is actually the difference over the State’s name, which is specifically excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 21(2) of the Interim Accord. In its Application, FYR Macedonia preemptively rebuts such an objection.[14]
Legal Aspects of the Dispute
The key question in this dispute is how to interpret Greece’s undertaking ‘not to object to the application by or the membership of’ FYR Macedonia in international organizations of which Greece is a member. Greece only reserved its right to object if FYR Macedonia seeks to be identified by any name other than ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’.
One possible interpretation of this provision would be that it obligates Greece ‘not to object’ to any application for membership to an international organization that FYR Macedonia submits irrespective of any (other) admission criteria, and that Greece only reserved the right to object if FYR Macedonia ‘is to be referred to in such organization’ differently from the name ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’. If such an interpretation were to be adopted, then Greece would appear to have breached Article 11(1). If a member of an international organization can unilaterally waive its discretion to determine whether a candidate State fulfills the organization’s admission criteria, then Greece would appear to have done so, and to have agreed to support any Macedonian application under the agreed name.
It could be argued, however, that as a matter of the law of international organizations, evaluation of a prospective member’s conformity with admission criteria is a duty to the other members or to the organization itself which an individual member cannot unilaterally waive. This principle is a corollary to the established principle that members are obligated not to condition admission to an organization on criteria other than those in the organization’s constitution.[15]
Another possibility would be to interpret Article 11(1) as meaning that as long as FYR Macedonia uses the agreed name, Greece cannot object solely on the basis of the name—but that Greece can still block the application if the applicant does not fulfill an organization’s membership or admission criteria, in this case the admission criteria in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Greece objected to FYR Macedonia’s invitation to join NATO not because Macedonia did not apply under its provisional name—which it did—but for other reasons. These are widely perceived to concern the lack of a final resolution of the dispute about the State’s name. But how would this fact mesh with the North Atlantic Treaty’s admission criteria? Article 10 of the Treaty provides that ‘[t]he parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.’[16] FYR Macedonia is quite self-evidently a European State. Greece may argue that FYR Macedonia is not ‘in a position to further the principles’ of the Treaty—these including, under Article 2, the contribution ‘toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by [...] promoting conditions of stability [...][17]’ —and therefore cannot join NATO.
The Court cannot determine ‘the reasons which, in the mind of a Member, may prompt its vote’ on admission of another State to membership in an organization;[18] rather, ‘the question can only relate to the statements made by a Member concerning the vote it proposes to give.’[19] Greece’s statements point toward the conclusion that it was the name issue that led to its veto in Bucharest.[20] But Greece’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that Greece connects the name dispute with the instability that this is causing in the region.[21] Greece can cite such an alleged failure of FYR Macedonia to ‘promote conditions of stability’ as required by the North Atlantic Treaty as a justification for the veto.[22]
One final important issue in the dispute could concern the permissibility of countermeasures by Greece in response to alleged previous breaches of the Interim Accord by FYR Macedonia. Greece has accused the Macedonian side of violating the Accord a number of times in the past.[23] It remains to be seen whether Greece will claim the NATO veto—if found in breach of Article 11(1) of the Interim Accord—to have been a countermeasure justified under general international law.[24] Such a claim could lead the Court to explore whether such countermeasures were justified or proportional.[25]
Conclusion
FYR Macedonia’s application to the International Court of Justice is the latest step in a long-standing dispute with Greece. Perhaps it is the best way for some progress to be made in a difficult situation that has been stagnating for far too long. The Court will be called upon, in any case, to tackle difficult questions of treaty interpretation, the rights and obligations of member-States to international organizations—in particular rights with respect to the admission of new members—and, quite possibly, the admissibility and limits of countermeasures.
About the Authors
Markos Karavias, M.Jur. (Oxon), an ASIL member, is D.Phil. candidate at the University of Oxford (St. Catherine’s College) and a member of the Athens Bar.
Antonios Tzanakopoulos, LL.M. (NYU), an ASIL member, is D.Phil. candidate at the University of Oxford (St. Anne’s College) and a member of the Athens Bar.
Endnotes

[1] ICJ Press Release No 2008/40, 17 November 2008, available on the Court’s website: http://www.icj-cij.org/ (last visited 16 December 2008).

[2] Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No 6 on the Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and its Member-States (11 January 1992) 31 I.L.M. 1507.

[3] See the Greek Memorandum annexed to UN Doc. S/25541 (1993).

[4] See Security Council Resolution 817 (1993) at para. 2. The said provision contains the following unique expression: ‘Recommends to the General Assembly that the State whose application is contained in Document S/25147 be admitted to membership in the United Nations, this State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State’ [emphasis added].

[5] See the rejection of interim measures requested by the Commission against Greece: Case C-120/94 R, Commission of the European Communities v the Hellenic Republic, [1994] E.C.R. I-03037. Note the subtle irony of the fact that Greece’s official constitutional name is ‘the Hellenic Republic’. It has become a member of the UN as ‘Greece’.

[6] Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the Interim Accord in the Languages of the Contracting Parties), Greece—the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (signed in New York 13 September 1995; entered into force 13 October 1995) 1891 U.N.T.S. I-32193; 34 I.L.M. 1461 [hereinafter: Interim Accord].

[7] Interim Accord, Article 5(1), referring directly to S.C.R. 817 (1993).

[8] Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, Press Release (2008)049 at para. 20, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html (last visited 16 December 2008).

[9] Republic of Macedonia, Application to the International Court of Justice, Dispute Concerning the Implementation of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (13 November 2008) at para. 5, available on the Court’s website: http://www.icj-cij.org/ (last visited 16 December 2008).

[10] North Atlantic Treaty (signed 4 April 1949, entered into force 24 August 1949) 34 U.N.T.S. 243, Article 10.

[11] See Dora Bakoyiannis, ‘Macedonia and NATO: The View from Athens’, International Herald Tribune, 31 March 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/31/opinion/edbakoy.php (last visited 16 December 2008).

[12] Id. at paras. 6 and 21-22.

[13] Id. at para. 23.

[14] Id. at para. 10.

[15] Cf. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57 at 62-63 and 64-65, which of course refers specifically to the interpretation of Article 4 of the UN Charter. However, this approach to admission criteria could be seen as applying to all international organizations whose constituent instruments provide for general admission conditions: see HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2003) 75-77; CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2005) 108.

[16] [emphasis added].

[17] [emphasis added].

[18] Conditions of Admission (n15) at 7.

[19] Id. [emphasis added].

[20] See Bakoyannis (n10); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, ‘The FYROM Name Issue’ available at http://www2.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/
South-Eastern+Europe/Balkans/Bilateral+Relations/FYROM/FYROM+-
+THE+NAME+ISSUE.htm (last visited 16 December 2008); ‘Text of Foreign Minister Ms Bakoyannis Speech to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs’ (20 February 2007) available at http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/21022007_McC_KL1651.htm (last visited 16 December 2008).

[21] See Dora Bakoyannis, ‘In the Name of a Common Future’, Washington Times, 29 April 2008, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008
/apr/29/in-the-name-of-a-common-future/ (last visited 16 December 2008); ‘Interview of Foreign Minister Ms Bakoyannis with the Romanian daily Romania Libera’ (23 November 2007) available at http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/271107_McC1135.htm (last visited 16 December 2008). Cf. also the Greek Memorandum (n3).

[22] See Bakoyannis (n21); ‘The FYROM Name Issue’ (n20); ‘Excerpts from Prime Minister Mr Kostas Karamanlis’ Speech on Foreign Policy before the Governing Party’s Parliamentary Group’ (27 March 2008) available at http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/27032008_SB1741.htm (last visited on 16 December 2008).

[23] ‘Text of FM Bakoyannis Speech’ (n20); ‘The FYROM Name Issue’ (n20).

[24] International Law Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), Articles 22 and 49.

[25] Id., Articles 51-52.

Source: ASIL Insights

The 1878 Congress of Berlin: its effect on the territorial status of Macedonia

The 1878 Congress of Berlin: its effect on the territo­rial status of Macedonia
by Konstandinos Vakalopoulos
abstract from the book "Modern History of Macedonia 1830-1912", 1988
Barbounakis Publishing

Public opinion within the Greek kingdom was divided in its aspirations as to the future status of the Greek provinces still under the Ottoman yoke, particularly after the unfavourable impression created by the preliminary treaty of San Stefano. Some maintained that Greece ought to seek annexation of the rebel provinces of Epirus and Thessaly, while leaving the fate of Macedonia and Thrace to the judgement of those Great Powers that were opposed to a Slav presence in the Aegean. A second body of opinion, more daring than the first, proposed a global solution, namely the acquisition by Greece of all Turkey's European provinces including Constantinople. In this way, they said, the Greek presence would come to constitute a genuine counterbalance to Slav infiltration. The Greek ambassador in Berlin, Alexandros Rangavis, for example, proposed that Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, the Aegean islands, the coast of Asia Minor, and Constantinople should all be attached to the Greek kingdom. In the case of negative reactions Greece should request the internationalization of Constantinople, and the temporary occupation of Macedonia and Thrace by a western power until such time as they were eventually awarded to Greece. Rangavis specifically stated that the expansion of the Greek state as far as the Bosporus was now no longer an insubstantial dream, but a European necessity[1].

The strong opposition of the Great Powers to the preliminary treaty of San Stefano made a decisive contribution to promoting support for the Greek case. In Britain, quite apart from the Philhellene stance of the press and of a large section of public opinion, government policy had become orientated once and for all towards the inevitable dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The tour of Macedonia made in March 1878 by Captain Synge, as already mentioned, is to be seen in the context of British attempts better to understand the situation in European Turkey. The Greek protests against the provisions of the San Stefano treaty were well-received in Italy, too. Further­more, the French diplomatic representatives within the Ottoman Empire also painted in gloomy colours the terms of the agreement, insofar as they affected the Greeks. Mallet, the French consul in Thessaloniki, was explicitly in favour of the cession of Western and Central Macedonia to Greece. Even official Austrian foreign policy rested on the conviction that Turkey could no longer keep its European provinces. Count Andrassy, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, favoured the application of a plan that would both suit Austrian interests and provide for the dismantlement of European Turkey That is to say, he supported the annexation by Greece of Epirus, Thessaly aJ part of Western Macedonia. Nevertheless, he was not against a Bulgaria! presence on the Aegean seaboard between Porto Lago and the mouth of m River Strymon. He did, however, reject the Bulgarian claims west of Strymon and north as far as Vranje, because these areas contained Greeks at; Albanians for the most part, and also because the Bulgarian claims woul prevent Austria's political and commercial expansion in the direction of Thessaloniki. Andrassy was even willing to support the founding of aj autonomous Macedonian province, independent of Bulgaria, but under thl political suzerainty of the Porte; it was to be bounded on the east by the Strymon, on the south by the Aegean and the Aliakmon, on the west byt' Albanian principality, and on the north by the Sar mountains[2].

While diplomatic activity continued in both Greece and Europe in the wake of the San Stefano treaty, the Slavophone Greek communities oi Macedonia did not cease proclaiming to the Greek government their intention of fighting alongside the Greek army, should Greece decide to seek a militanj confrontation with Turkey[3]. In early May 1878 the Congress of Berlin wa^ convoked, with the object of reviewing the terms of the preliminary treaty of] San Stefano, to which one Great Power after another (especially Britain) had] expressed its opposition. The official Greek line had already been laid down, and consisted of a minimum programme of territorial claims, which included Epirus, Thessaly and Crete. The Greek side expected the Congress to respond to pressure from Britain and to refuse to countenance the incorporation of Macedonia and Thrace within Bulgaria. British policy, meanwhile, was motivated by the desire to check Russian infiltration in the Balkans, to establish an essential Greek presence as a counterpoise to Russian activity, and to secure the compliance of the Greek state with the suppression of revolt in the Ottoman provinces[4]. Thus there was considerable British diplomatic activity on the one hand, while a strong likelihood existed on the other of a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. Against this background, King George I held a meeting with Wyndham, the British charge d'affaires in Athens, and agreed that the northern frontier of the Greek state should consist of the course of the River Aliakmon from the Thermaic Gulf to the Lake of Kastoria, and from there should follow the course of the River Aoos as far as the Adriatic[5].

At the Congress of Berlin the possibility of participation by Greek delegates was duly discussed. The British representative, Lord Salisbury, requested that the Greek presence should be restricted to those sessions directly concerned with Turkey's Greek provinces, namely Crete, Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace. The request was granted, but held good only for the provinces bordering on the Greek state and for Crete[6]. The Greek delegation, headed by Theodore Deligiannis, had instructions to demand Epirus, Thessaly and Crete for Greece, and to make common cause with those European powers that disagreed with the cession of Macedonia and Thrace to Bulgaria, but consented to the granting of autonomy to them under the superintendance of the consuls of the Great Powers[7]. Lord Salisbury's speech at the session of 17 July 1878 in Berlin was especially revealing of the political situation in Macedonia at the time. He spoke about the worsening of intercommunal strife in the region, particularly after 1870, and about the founding of the Exarchate, the harsh conflict between Greeks and Bulgarians for possession of the schools and churches, and the unequal representation of Greeks and Slavs at the Berlin Congress, given that the Russian representati­ves exclusively served the Bulgarian cause[8].

The final text of the treaty of Berlin (1/13 July 1878) called upon the Porte to come to an agreement with Greece as regards the frontiers of Epirus and Thessaly. It also laid down that a Bulgarian principality should be founded, and provided for substantial changes in the political regime of Eastern Rumelia[9]. Article 23 provided for the introduction of administrative reforms in Turkey's remaining European provinces, Macedonia among them, on the basis of Crete's Organic Statute of 1868. According to this, the formation of joint committees with the participation of local Christians would be proposed to the Sultan in every administrative region[10]. As a result, local committees were indeed set up in 1879-80 in the capitals of the vilayets of Thessaloniki, Adrianople, Monastir and Ioannina, to study the possibility of reforms whereby Christians and Muslims would acquire the right to participate in local administration. Relevant proposals were to be sent to Constantinople. The Congress of Berlin also legislated on behalf of the monks of Mount Athos, who were henceforth to have absolute equality of rights[11]. Let it be noted here that Russian monks first settled officially on Mount Athos between 1873 and 1876; in 1883 they were reckoned to number 998, as compared with 2,412 Greek, 200 Bulgarian and 206 Romanian monks[12]. Another decisive step for the political future of Macedonia was the granting of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria. (In 1878 it was laid down that Austria should occupy the two provinces temporarily; and in 1881 the annexation was finalized). This event deprived Serbia of any outlet to the west, and inevitably turned its sights towards Macedonia, where the national aspirations of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia were bound to clash[13].

The Congress of Berlin did not make any final settlement either on the Epirus and Thessaly frontier question or on the other matters which interested the Christian Ottoman subjects. This lack of a definitive solution obliged Greek foreign policy to abandon its stand of 'impeccability' (in the Turkish regard), so as to put pressure on Turkey and the Great Powers. The continuing insurrection in Western Macedonia provided the necessary opportunity for the perpetuation of unrest in Macedonia with the consent, and indeed the encouragement, of the Greek government[14].

Moreover, other Balkan states, too, like Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania, not to mention the Albanians, were also displeased about the frontiers allotted to them in the treaty. In the future they were to concentrate their efforts on winning for themselves the Christian communities of Macedonia at that time living under Ottoman rule. Thus the harsh rivalry between the various Balkan states, which became even sharper in Macedonia after 1878, was entirely accounted for by the ethnic composition of the region's population[15]. The analysis and interpretation of this complex phenomenon falls thematically into another phase in the history of the Macedonian problem: namely that which began after the Berlin Congress and lasted until 1908. An indication of the unrest which prevailed among the Christian communities of Macedonia during this time was the Bulgarian uprising, which occurred in the adjoining Males and Kresna districts of North-Eastern Macedonia. Quite a large number of Greeks from Thessaly and Macedonia took part in this uprising, because they had expectations of the ultimate abolition of Turkish rule, and gave priority to the liberation of Macedonia over and above any national differen­ces between the various Christian groups[16].

During the period which preceded the Congress of Berlin, nationalistic activity by the Serbians had not reached any great pitch in Macedonia. The Committee for the Schools and Teachers of Old Serbia, funded by the Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had assumed responsibility for the education of Macedonian schoolchildren in Serbia and for the issue of Serbian schoolbooks to various schools in Macedonia [17]. The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876, however, interrupted for a time the work of the Serbians in Macedonia; their activity recommenced more systematically in the late 1880s[18].

At the time of the Berlin Congress the Albanians gave the first signs of their own national awakening. They were profoundly disturbed by the prospect of the expansion of Montenegro and by the Greek claims in Epirus, part of which, the Koritsa sanjak, was contained within the Monastir vilayet. The founding of the Prizren Union of Albanians in June 1878 was directed towards preventing the annexation of territory regarded as Albanian and towards the establishment of an autonomous system of government within the Ottoman Empire. Albanian efforts to publicize their cause among the Great Powers conferring at Berlin included the dispatch of streams of petitions and memoranda to the delegates, which all sought the creation of an autonomous Albanian state. Despite Albanian opposition, Greece continued to support the proposal of a dual Greco-Albanian state on the pattern of Austro-Hungary. Be that as it may, it is a fact that the Albanian movement was unable to make much headway in Macedonia up to, and even after, 1878. The major stumbling-blocks to its progress were: the permanent state of anarchy which prevailed in all areas where there were compact Albanian communities; the strong cultural and religious contrasts existing within the Albanian people themselves; the opposing political interests of Italy and Austria; and the Porte's negative reaction to the proposed Albanian state[19].

Although Romania had no hope of expanding into the Macedonian region, during the Berlin Congress it redoubled its efforts on behalf of the proselytism of Vlach-speaking Macedonians. Its motive was to obtain a pawn in future negotiations on its frontier differences with Bulgaria in the Dobruja area. Romania had already been angered by Russia's annexation of Bessarabia in 1878, and by the presence of some six million 'irredent' Romanians in the Austro-Hungarian provinces of Banat and Bucovina in Transylvania. So now Romanian foreign policy turned its attention directly to Macedonia, in a 'paroxysm of national pride', as N. Vlachos termed it[20]. In the aftermath of the Berlin Congress there was a considerable upsurge of Romanian activity in the Ioannina and Monastir vilayets. After the inauguration in 1879 of a Macedono-Romanian association in Bucharest and the establishment of a Romanian consulate in Thessaloniki, the situation intensified. In the Thessaloniki vilayet, however, the Romanians seem to have been less active[21].

[1]-E. Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, p. 195 and note 1.
[2]-For details of the Great Powers' attitude to the San Stefano treaty, see op. cit., pp. 198-205; Β. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 443, 446; C. Naltsas, Der San Stefano Vertrag..., pp. 54-6.
[3]-I. Notaris, Αρχείον Στεφάνου Δραγούμη, p. 37.
[4]-Ε. Kofos, Η επανάστασις της Μακεδονίας, ρ. 38; idem, Ο ελληνισμός στην περίοδο 1869-1881, pp. 124-7; idem, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, pp. 207f, including details of the British attitude.
[5]-E. Kofos, Ο ελληνισμός στην περίοδο 1869-1881, p. 128; idem, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, pp. 221-2.
[6]-C. Naltsas, op. cit., pp. 57-8; E. Kofos, Ο ελληνισμός..., p. 131.
[7]-Ε. Kofos, op. cit., p. 132.
[8]-Documents diplomatiques: Affaires d'Orient, pp. 74-5.
[9]-H. R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, p. 89.
[10]-Documents diplomatiques: Affaires d'Orient, pp. 283-4; A. d'Avril, Negociations relatives au traite de Berlin, pp. 363-4; A. Schopoff, Les Reformes et la protection desChretiens, p. 380; Henryk Batowski, 'Die territorialen Bestimmungen von San Stefanod Berlin', in Der Berliner Kongress von 1878: Die Politik der Grossmachte und die ProblmA Modernisierung in Siidosteuropa in der zweiten Halfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Wiesbaden, 1911 p. 69.
[11]-E. Kofos, Ο ελληνισμός στην περίοδο 1869-1881, p. 132-9, 159; idem, Greecim the Eastern Crisis, pp. 229f; Manol Pandefski, 'Makedonija vo medunarodnite sporodl dogovori vo vremeto na Istocnata Kriza', Makedonija vo Istocnata Kriza, pp. 70-2.9
[12]-N. Vlachos, To Μακεδονικόν ως φάσις του Ανατολικού Ζητήματος, pp. 206-1
[13]-Ν. Vlachos, op. cit., p. 29; C. Naltsas, To Μακεδονικόν Ζήτημα και η ΣοβιιΛ πολιτική (Thessaloniki, 1954), pp. 70-1; Barbara Jelavich, 'Russia, Britain and the Bulgaiii Question 1885-1888', Siidost- Forschungen 32 (1973) 168; K. Vakalopoulos, 0 Bid ελληνισμός, p. 63.
[14]-E. Kofos, Η επανάστασις της Μακεδονίας, p. 42; idem, Greece and thehm Crisis, pp. 251-2.
[15]-Cf. K. Vakalopoulos, Ο Βόρειος ελληνισμός, pp. 11-12.
[16]-Concerning the Bulgarian uprising in 1878, see the detailed bibliography illVakalopoulos, op. cit., p. 52, note 123; F. Adanir, Die Makedonische Frage, pp. 86-1.0] numerous French consular reports in Francuski dokumenti za istorijata na Makedorim narod, pp. 231-3, 237-40, 243-8, and particularly pp. 245, 251, 252-4f.
[17]-L. Doklestic, Srpsko-Makedonskite odnosi vo XIX-ot vek, p. 453.
[18]-K. Vakalopoulos, op. cit., pp. 328-9, for details.
[19]-For details, see Vasilis Kondis, Ό Αλβανικός Σύνδεσμος της Πρισρένηςκίρόλος του στο ζήτημα του καθορισμού των Ηπειρωτικών συνόρων', Βαλκανικά ΣνμμΑ5 (1976) 201-2 (Appendix), including copious bibliography. Cf. N. Vlachos, op. cit.p.l F. Adanir, op. cit., pp. 83-6; K. Vakalopoulos, op. cit., p. 67 and notes 203,204,205,fori fundamental published literature on the Albanian question during this period.
[20]-N. Vlachos, op. cit., pp. 34-5.
[21]-For details, see Karl Adolf Bratter, Die Kutzowallachische Frage (Hamburg, Μp. 64; Alexandre Rubin, Les Roumains de Macedoine, p. 143; Max-Demeter Peyfuss,! Aromunische Frage: Ihre Entwicklung von den Ursprilngen bis zum Frieden von Bukarest(IU und die Haltung Osterreich-Ungarns, pp. 54-5; K. Vakalopoulos, op. cit., pp. 95-7.

FOR FAIR USE ONLY

Victor Friedman fallacies

This article is a response to Professor Victor Friedman that is being considered by some people as one of the foremost experts on Balkan languages and in his thesis as about the so-called “Macedonian language”.

At the outset, it appears that the Greeks reject outright the existence of a "Macedonian nation", a "Macedonian language" and even a "Macedonian republic". A more careful study of Greek views, however, would reveal that the Greeks do not dispute the existence of a nation, a language or a republic after 1944, but they rather refute the legitimacy of the appropriation of the Macedonian name for defining a Slavic population in the Balkans. For the Greeks—as for the Bulgarians—the name "Macedonian" is merely a geogra*phical term that applies equally to any native of the wider Macedonian region, irrespective of his or her national identity. Unlike the Bulgarians, for the Greeks the name by itself is a cherished historical feature, an inseparable element of Greek cultural heritage for well over two and a half millennia. Understandably, it is highly unlikely to expect them to consent to the arbitrary appropriation of the Macedonian name by a Slavic people across their frontiers.

Mr Freidman is one of this outsiders. Lets' see what are the fallacies of the Professor.

Fallacy 1 _The usage of the term “Macedonian Language”

The language spoken by the majority of the Slavic people of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) which they have quite arbitrarily called “Macedonian”, is a Slavic dialect, so closely resembling Bulgarian and Serbian, that according to linguistic principles it can hardly be considered an independent language at a par with the other two. [1]

The linguistic frontiers on the Serb and Bulgarian sides are lost in the fluidity of equally divided linguistic groups on either side and are impossible to determine. The so-called «Macedonian» dialect is, in fact, an intermediate stage between Bulgarian and Serb. As someone moves towards Bulgaria, the Serb elements grow rarer while the Bulgarian elements multiply and vice versa. For that reason, just as the Skopje region was the apple of discord between the politicians of Bulgaria and Serbia, so its language has become an object of dispute. Serbian linguists stress its affinities with the Serb language; Bulgarians emphasize its similarities with Bulgarian. Both are anxious to prove that it is really an extension of their respective languages.

This is the recent – in the frames of the 20th century – language of the FYROM State (created, as it is known, during the era of Tito in 1944). This is the Bulgarian language (the first people in the region are Bulgarians and Bulgarians have always claimed on this lands, which their consider their won – in fact people living in the region used to call themselves Bugari! This language is artificially ‘Serbianized’ (!), i.e. some lexis and grammatical elements of the surrounding regions, where the Serbian language was spoken, were added to it so that to lower the Bulgarian language element and adopt the Serbian language form, which is the requirement of Tito’s United Serbia, the Yugoslavian Republic.

Thus, the Slavic language in FYROM is a Serbian-Bulgarian language, a Bulgarian language that has been artificially Serbianized, adopted as official language because of obvious reasons which the Bulgarians call ‘Kolisevski’. The Skopje citizens themselves gave this language, the Serbian-Bulgarian, the name “Macedonian”, to avoid future claims on behalf of Bulgaria and to also hide the Bulgarian origin of the language. In addition, to usurp a right over a name (Macedonian), which bears prestige and historical notion (by fake identification with the greatness and world known name Macedonia of Alexander the Great) and finally – because their impudence has no limit [2]

Finally I want to add something that Mr Victor Friedman avoided to mention in his works regarding this language. In the early years there were many difficulties in securing wide usage of the still-changing new Slavic language of the FYROM. Writings of the old Bulgarian revolutionaries (Macedonian according the FYROM historiography) and often even speeches and articles by party leaders had to translated or adjusted before being used. [3]

Why ?

Is it true that Bulgarians doesn’t have any problem as about the reading ?

Fallacy 2_The usage of the “Aegean macedonia” as geographical definition.

Friedman re-produces this known irredentist term in many articles and encycopedias. [4]

"Aegean Macedonia"is a Slavic Macedonian irredentist term used to refer to the region of Macedonia in Greece, in the context of a 'United Macedonia'. The origins of the term seem to be rooted in the 1940s but its modern usage is widely considered ambiguous and irredentist. The term has occasionally appeared on maps circulated in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), which envisioned Greek Macedonia (referred to as "Aegean Macedonia") as part of a "Greater Macedonia", and is regarded as a challenge of the legitimacy of Greek sovereignty over the area.[5]

There is also one more addition about this fallacy and concern the Vardar region. The Historical and geographical Macedonian borders until 1944 never included the middle and North FYROM. At the past identified as Kosovo, Vardar, South Moesia and Dardania. The entrance of these regions in Macedonia is clearly a political choice of the Yugoslav Communists first and USA lately.

Fallacy 3_The selective usage of his sources.

Victor Freidman writes

“The first two writers to publish books in a language based on Macedonian dialects were Hadzi Joakim KrEovski (d. 1820), who used a language based on the Kratovo-Kriva Palanka dialects of northeastern Macedonia, and his somewhat younger contemporary HadZi Kiril PejEinovik (c.. 1770-1845), who wrote in the Tetovo dialect, with fewer Church Slavonicisms than Joakim (Lunt 1953:336)'Both these writers called their language Bulgarian, but since their dialects were Macedonian, they can be considered as the first to publish books in some form of Macedonian (Koneski 1967a:88).” [6]

In this abstract we have the oxymoron that when the 19^th cent writers mentioned that their own language is Bulgarian, Mr Freidman support that the earliest books were written in “Macedonian dialects” and uses as his source the Slavic Macedonian Blaze Koneski.

Who is Blaze Konezski ?

In Tito’s Yugoslav federations and in order to sever the linguistic bonds between the "Macedonians" and Serbs and Bulgarians, a new language was fabricated and touted as a separate Macedonian language, the language, it was said, of Alexander the Great. In contrast to Alexander's language, which had an alphabet (Greek), the present "Macedonian" language did not have an alphabet until 1945.To complete the deception; Tito commissioned the linguist Blago Konev (he changed his name later to Blaze Koneski) to devise an alphabet. Koneski modified the Serbian version of the Cyrillic alphabet and called it the "Macedonian alphabet". This is the source of Mr Victor Friedman, a propagandist linguist that changed his name and a Serbian alphabet in order to de-bulgarize his past.

Of course Victor Friedman avoids using alternatives sources in his work in the Slavic language of the FYROM such us Greek, Serbians and Bulgarian professors.

Fallacy 4_The usage of the Macedonian term as ethnicity.

I will begin my analysis with the term English term "Macedonian" and its meaning: A Macedonian according to several sources [7][8] is a native or inhabitant of the (Ancient or Modern) Macedonian region. I was born in Thessaloniki and my family's origin can be traced from that city, as well as Eastern Macedonia 150 years ago.

So am I Macedonian according to Mr Victor Friedman’s historical and linguist method process?

According to the known English dictionaries I am. But I am not “Macedonian” speaker and ethnical according to Friedman thesis.

Some Remarks related to the FYROM historiography.

FYROMacedonian historiography and the political system wanted to keep the separate political and national existence to this newly-established republic. As we know, the main characteristics of a nation are: unity of country (with the meaning of common fatherland) and of political organisation, language, religion and heritage, which are joined by a common past, common consciousness - characteristics which alone are not enough or indeed necessary but which in combination create the separate identity of a nation. They tried to keep these characteristics to the new "Republic of Macedonia". They wanted, in other words, to fabricate a nation. By means of their studies and publications they attemped to reconstruct and re-interpret historical data in order to fulfil their objectives. Maria Nystazopoulou Pelekidou writes with regards to this:

• Their first aim is to cut off every link between the so-called "Macedonians" and the Bulgarians, as a well as the Serbs, and to convince the people that they belonged to a separate Slavic nation, the "Macedonian" one.
  
• The second aim is to eliminate the Greek character of Macedonia and Macedonian history; and this would be achieved by minimizing the Greek presence in this region and misinterpreting or falsifying their role, specifically the cultural and intellectual contribution of Hellenism, the orthodox Greek clergy and Greek schools.
  
• The third aim is to search for, fabricate and project the historical development of the so-called "Macedonian people", so as to prove the separate national identity of the "Macedonians", as well as their cohesion and continuity from ancient times until today.
  
• The fourth aim is to create a Great Idea, which would bring awareness to the masses. So the historians of Skopje started declaring that Macedonia, as a whole, was a Slavic country both in its historical tradition and its ethnic composition. For this reason, it had to be united and form a unified state. [9]

Epilogue

Unfortunately many of the authoritative views of the American academic establishment does not follow Arthur Schlesinger advice about the purpose of the history in theirs writings:

The purpose of history is to promote not group self-esteem, but understanding of the world and the past, dispassionate analysis, judgment and perspective, respect for divergent cultures and traditions, and unflinching protection for those unifying ideas of tolerance, democracy, and human rights that make free historical inquiry possible. [10]

Any attempt to question the authenticity of the Macedonian history (part of the Greek civilization) is of direct concern even to people who ordinarily have little interest in the remote past. I will suggest that arguing that writers as Victor Friedman offer a valid interpretation of history and the linguistics is similar to being comfortable with the notion that the earth is flat . But although such new and daring hypotheses about the past can easily win adherents, especially when they favor present cultural and political aspirations, everyone should be aware that there are real dangers in allowing history to be rewritten, even for culturally useful purposes. Even though it may inspire students with pride and self-confidence, writing and teaching such ethnic histories, each with its own brand of "ethnic truth," sanctions the invention of falsehoods.

Notes

[1]- Andriotis, The Federative Republic Of Skopje and Its Language, EMS, 1966

[2]-FYROM Linguistic forgeries:The «Macedonian» language of the Skopje and the Slav Macedonian minority, Academic George Babiniotis ,newspaper VIMA, Sunday 3 Aug 2008

[3]-Parker, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, page156, 1966

[4]-a. Macedonian Language and Nationalism During the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,1996 b. International Journal of the Socilogy of the Language 52, 1985.

[5] -"The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World", Loring M. Danforth, p. 37

[6] - Macedonian Language and Nationalism During the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 1976

[7] -http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Macedonian

[8] - http://www.thefreedictionary.com/macedonian

[9]-- Maria Nystazopoulou-Pelekidoy, The Macedonian Question, 1992

[10]- Arthur Schlesinger , The Disuniting of America, page 99