The role of the Communist International in the hatching of the “Macedonian nation”.

By Spyridon Sfetas

Abstract from the article “The Birth of ‘Macedonianism’ in the Interwar Period” and the book “The History of Macedonia, Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, 2010”.

In historiography the view that the 'Macedonian nation' was a creation of Tito is widespread. This position can of course not be denied, since the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) had particular reasons for promoting 'Macedonianism' in Yugoslav Macedonia as a counterweight ideology to Bulgarian-Serbian competition in the interwar period. The need to detach the Slavs of Macedonia from Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian influence with the creation of a collective Slav-Macedonian identity had already been underscored in the early 20th century by a number of Slav intellectuals, such as Krste Misirkov, Stefan Dedov, Diamandi Misajkov and Dimitrija Cupovski. Foreseeing that the antagonism between Serbs and Bulgarians was continuing at the expense of the local population and that it only perpetuated Turkish rule, they sought to have the Slavs of Macedonia acknowledged as a separate community (millet). Even so, the political conditions of the early 20th century did not favour the advocacy of Slav-Macedonianism as a new collective ethnic identity, and its early proponents had very little impact on the masses. The political and ideological origins of 'Macedonianism' were essentially posed by the Third Communist International (the Comintern) in the interwar period. It is documented that the Communist International saw the Macedonian question as a tactical issue, relating to the political conditions of the time.[1] The publication of important documents for the period 1923-1925 from the Comintern archive has essentially confirmed the view that there were specific reasons as to why the Communist International was promoting a United and Independent Macedonia within a Balkan Soviet Republic. These were to assist IMRO in its attempt to create a unified front between the Bulgarian Communists, the Bulgarian Farmers and Bulgarian-Macedonian organizations for the advance of the revolution in Bulgaria, the establishment of a government of workers and farmers and the destabilization of the Balkan states.[2] According to the Communist International, the Macedonian organisations in Bulgaria should not only disassociate themselves from the influence of Bulgarian 'bourgeois' political elements, but also estrange themselves from Bulgarian nationalism. Criticising the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) for the neutral stand it took during the coup against the agrarian government of Aleksandr Stambolijski, Karl Radek expressed himself in the following way at the plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (12-13 June 1923) in Moscow:

NYTimes 1965 - The Yugoslav Propaganda in the artificial “Nation-building” of what is today’s FYROM

Click the images to view them in higher resolution.

by history-of-macedonia.com

The Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia, part 2 (WW II)

[From the book “Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia) by Evangelos Kofos, Institute for Balkan Studies, pages 102-107]

Occupation in Western Macedonia

From the first days of the occupation, the Bulgarians indicated that they would not be satisfied with Eastern Macedonia only. Their objectives included the acquisition of the Central and Western parts of Greek Ma­cedonia with the port of Thessaloniki. Western and Central Macedonia constituted the lifeline not only of the German forces in Greece, but also of the German divisions fighting in Northern Africa. It was understand­able, therefore, that the Germans would entrust neither to their Italian nor to their Bulgarian allies the administration of the vital port of Thessalo­niki and the Vardar (Axios) Valley. Only some remote parts of Western Macedonia were included in the Italian zone of occupation.

The Bulgarians, on the other hand, were determined to extend their control to those regions by any means. The fact that in this area lived appro­ximately 80,000 Slav-speaking inhabitants of whom a large segment had at the time of the German invasion, openly shown pro-Bulgarian sentiments, provided a further inducement and an excuse. On the whole, these Slav-speaking inhabitants had settled peacefully in the country and were it not for the Axis invasion and Bulgarian propaganda reviving in many old Bul­garian sympathies, they would have gradually been assimilated by the more populous Greek-speaking element.[1]

It was easy for the Bulgarians to persecute, evict or take as hostages thousands of Greeks from that part of Macedonia which was under their jurisdiction, but in German-occupied Western Macedonia, they needed to enlist the support of at least the Slavophones who were by no means en­tirely sympathetic to them. They had also to convince the Germans that Western Macedonia was heavily inhabited by Bulgarians; a very ambitious task, indeed.

The first objective, i.e. the proselytization of the Slavophones, had started even during the course of the Greco-Italian war when the Bulga­rians succeeded in obtaining from Italy special treatment for Greek pri­soners of war from Macedonia who were willing to declare themselves Bulgarians. [2]

The collapse of the Greek front in Macedonia before the onrushing German divisions created a psychological uneasiness among the inhabitants of the region. Militant Bulgarian-sympathisers waged a war of nerves against the native Greek population through the arrogant display of Bulgarian flags, and rumors that momentarily the Bulgarian Army would oc­cupy Western Macedonia. [3]

From May through July 1941, the situation worsened. The Greek Gendarmerie and officials of the local administration had followed the retreating army to the south. A number of Bulgarian sympathizers took advantage of the situation to form armed bands and terrorize the Greek population. The situation remained unchanged until July when the Greek authorities were allowed by the Germans to return to the region. [4]

The Bulgarians countered with a better organized, long-range plan to acquire control of the area. With the consent of the Germans, they estab­lished in Thessaloniki a Bulgarian Association which was founded osten­sibly, "for the cultural advancement and mutual assistance of its mem­bers." In fact, it became the center of Bulgarian efforts to seize Greek Western Macedonia through propaganda and, later, through coercion.

According to its Statute [5] (Article 4), only Bulgarians who were born in Macedonia, or Bulgarians of Macedonian origin could be admitted to the Association. Identity cards were issued for the members entitling them to special privileges and rich food rations, [6] a determining factor in sway­ing the loyalties of needy peasants in famine-stricken Macedonia. The Statute was confirmed on October 26, 1941, by General Von Krensky, German Commander of Thessaloniki and the Aegean, under condition that only Bulgarian citizens or Greeks of Bulgarian nationality could be admit­ted to membership. Furthermore, it was stipulated that the Association would be subjected to the laws of the German-installed Greek Government. It is interesting to note that it explicitly prohibited any financial advant­ages to the members, [7] a clause which was never observed.

The Greek Government in Athens strongly protested the establish­ment of this Bulgarian center in Thessaloniki. In a long memorandum to the Reich authorities in Greece, dated October 16, 1941, the Prime Minister complained that agents of the Bulgarian Association did not confine them­selves to conducting propaganda but were engaged in acts of terrorism against the Greek population. In addition, the Prime Minister contended that leading Bulgarian agents were communists as were most of the re­cruited and secretly armed peasants. Indicative of the aims of the Bulga-rians, said the Prime Minister, was the discovery by the German authori­ties in a village of Fiorina of concealed weapons which were enough to arm a whole battalion. [8]

The Germans failed to take any definite action on the basis of of­ficial Greek complaints, to curtail the discrepancies of the Bulgarians. This prompted the Bulgarians to adopt even more aggressive measures. Liaison officers were appointed to the German military headquarters in Thessalo­niki and other cities. They soon became agents of an ambitious plan aimed at convincing the Germans that Western Macedonia was inhabited mostly by Bulgarians. [9] The Bulgarians tried also to expand their influence to the monastery community of Mount Athos. In February 1942, reports reached the Athens Government that the few Bulgarian monks of Mount Athos, apparently on instructions by the Bulgarian Government, were engaged in an effort to secure an order from the Germans for the eviction of the Greek authorities. Their plan aimed at internationalizing the monastery community—long the cradle of Orthodoxy in the Balkans—as a first step toward its subjection to Bulgarian control [ 10]

The Germans, although they condoned the Bulgarian activities in German-occupied Macedonia, did not seem to consent to the Bulgarian demand to extend their authority into other regions as well. This German attitude convinced the Bulgarians that to succeed in their plans they had to rely on their own efforts. Thus, they were able to be entrusted with the distribution of foodstuffs donated by the International Red Cross. They declared that only those signing up as Bulgarians would receive food ra­tions. However, even this method failed to produce impressive results as only 14,709 persons were given Bulgarian identity cards [11]

The failure of the food distribution plan caused the Bulgarians to adopt more stringent methods. Through their liaison officers they succeed­ed in organizing and secretly arming their followers in the Western Macedonian districts. The German authorities were aware of the Bulga­rian activities, but they were not inclined to take drastic measures against their allies.

As the situation deteriorated further, the Athens Government was compelled to protest, once again, to the Reich supreme authorities in Greece, in the strongest language permitted. The protest went as far as to accuse the local German authorities of tolerating and sheltering the activities of Bulgarian agents. It is worth quoting extensively from this document:

The present Greek Government, having accepted to govern the country under extremely difficult conditions and circumstances, set out, as one of its primary objectives, the bridging of the chasm —which bad fortune had created between the Greek and the German peoples—, the re-establishment of the long-existing feelings of friend­ship and mutual esteem, and the rapprochement of the Greek peo­ple with the objectives and tendencies of New Germany. [The Go­vernment] finds itself in the difficult position of having to acknow­ledge that its efforts in these directions have not brought the desired results, principally on account of the utterly unpsychological attitude of certain military authorities toward the Bulgarian claims in districts inhabited by crushing majorities of pure Greek populations for which the Greek people have for decades, paid with heavy sacrifices.

The Greek Government... would feel deep gratitude if it were assi­sted in its efforts by the German Government and by its local po­litical and military representatives. [The Government's efforts] would be successfully carried out by the removal from German-occupied Greek Macedonia of every center of Bulgarian propaganda. Such are mainly today the Bulgarian Association of Thessaloniki and the Bulgarian liaison officers attached to the various German city headquarters...[12]

Greek protests, however, had little if any effect. The Bulgarian liai­son officers—among whom a Lieutenant Kaltchev played a major role-continued to organize militarily their followers hoping that eventually they would be invited by the Germans to take over the administration of the region. Bulgarian hopes appeared to have a better chance when Greek partisans began to make their appearance on the mountains of Macedonia. In the Italian administered zone, the authorities permitted the pro-Bulga­rian Slavophones to form armed security units, [13] which were entrusted with the maintenance of “order and peace” [14] It is interesting to note that, from the beginning, these newly-formed security units—popularly known as "Ohrana battalions" [15] —did not receive their orders from the Italian authorities but from the Bulgarian liaison officers. In a short time they became notorious for their persecution of the Greek inhabitants. In the Kastoria region alone, they burned more than forty villages [16]

The Italian Armistice in November 1943, removed a serious obstacle from Bulgaria's efforts to extend her control over most of Greek Macedo­nia. The Germans, engaged in critical combat in both the Eastern and Ita­lian fronts, had neither the units to spare for occupation duty, nor the time to investigate the conduct of their Bulgarian allies in their zone of occupation. In the summer of 1943 they offered them an additional strip of land west of the Strymon river which included most of the Kilkis Prefecture and the northern part of the Thessaloniki Prefecture, including Chalkidiki [17] After the war, at the Sofia trial of the leaders of the wartime Bulgarian government, the Crown Counselor, Jordan Sevov, revealed that the Bulgarian Government had debated at that time whether to extend the zone of occupation to include Thessaloniki. It had failed to reach an agreement primarily on account of the General Staff which rai­sed objections for purely military considerations. [18] Finally, in the closing days of the occupation—late in 1944—the Bulgarians attempted clandes­tinely to extend their military authority into three more districts of Central and Western Macedonia, namely Edessa, Kastoria and Fiorina. This move, which was bound to be short-lived, had no other meaning than to register Bulgarian presence in a Greek region long claimed by the Bulgarians, ap­parently in the remote hope that the course of international developments might allow them to remain in possession of the regions they occupied.

On September 9, the Bulgarian Government was overthrown by the Fatherland Front. However, despite the Government change, the Bulgarians still hoped to remain in the occupied regions on the pretext of fighting the Germans. Stern Allied demarches forced them to leave all Greek lands by late November 1944.

NOTES

[1]- Barker, op. cit., p. 31.
[2]- Following the occupation of Greece, these prisoners of war were transported to Bulgaria and there is evidence to suggest that they were later sent back to Greece to form Bulgarian organizations. Kostas Bramos, Σλαυοκομμουνιστικαι 'Ορ­γανώσεις έν Μακεδονία: Προπαγάνδα και Επαναστατική Δράσις [Communist-Slav Organizations in Macedonia; Propaganda and Revolutionary Activities], First Edi­tion (Thessaloniki: 1954), pp. 102-103.
[3]- Naltsas, op. cit.. p. 217
[4]-Demetrios G. Zapheiropoulos, To KKE και ή Μακεδονία [The KKE andMacedonia], (Athens, 1948), p. 10.
[5]- Statute in GFM, E/1028/VI/1/1941 (File I/3a/1941-1942).
[6]- Ibid.
[7]- Order V5, Volk 4; in GFM, E/1029/VI/1/1941
[8]- No 51, dated October 16, 1941, in GFM, Nr. E/860/VI,3. The evidence was corroborated by a secret report of the Thessaloniki Police which informed the Go­vernment that anarchists and communists were admitted to the Bulgarian Association. GFM, File I/3a'1941-42.
[9]- Confidential report of the Edessa Gendramerie dated August 31, 1941. Text in GFM Archives. Also Naltsas, op. cit., p. 263.
[10]- GFM, "'Prime Minister's File,"' Ε/68, 1/36/1942.
[11]- Bramos, op. cit., [First Edition], p. 105.
[12]- GFM, File No I/3b/1942, Nr. E/595/l/3a/v dated October 23, 1942. In the knowledge of the author, this is the first time that this document is published.
[13]- Naltsas, op. cit., p. 217.
[14]- Zapheiropoulos, op. cit., p. 19.
[15]- "Comments and Oral Statement Made by the Liaison Representative ofGreece on Parts II and III of the Report, 'Memorandum on the Slavophones of Greece', United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 2nd year, Special Supplement, No. 2, Report by the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to the Security Council, Vol. Ill (S/360 Rev. 1; July 28, 1950), (New York, 1950), pp. 323 - 327, [hereafter referred to as "Memorandum on the Slavophones of Greece"].
[16]- Ibid., p. 326
[17]- Petros Monastiriotis, Oi Πρώσσοι των Βαλκανίων [The Prussians of the Balkans], (Cairo : 1944), p. 60.
[18]- Report by the Greek Ambassador to Ankara, dated January 10, 1945, GFM, A/7931/1945.

FOR FAIR USE ONLY

Mihajlo Apostolski, a Slav Macedonian with Bulgarian Nationality

Mihajlo Apostolski, born as Mihail Apostolov, (Bulgarian: Михаил Апостолов, Михаjло Апостолски) (8 November 1901 in Štip, Ottoman Empire (now Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)-7 August 1987 in Dojran, SFR Yugoslavia (now Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) was a Communist general, politician and historian in Yugoslavia. Between World War I and World War II he entered in an Officer's school in Kingdom of Yugoslavia and became a major. During the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia in April, 1941, he was captured and interned in a POW camp near Milan by German troops. Shortly after his father made a request to the Bulgarian Minister of Defense, where he wrote, his son was "Bulgarian by origin", his parents too, and he himself was wounded, as a volunteer in the Bulgarian Army during the First World War that Apostolov have to be liberated. The request was granted soon.[1][2][3][4]

the requestsent by the father of Mihail Apostolov from Novo Selo ( district of Shtip)to the Minister of War of the Bulgarian Kingdom. He requests that his sonbe liberated from an Italian POW camp and emphasizes the sincere Bulgarianfeelings of the family.[5]

After his liberation, Apostolov changed his name to Mihajlo Apostolski, entered the Macedonian National Liberation Army (led by Communists) and became a partisan leader in the National Liberation War of Macedonia against Axis-allied Bulgaria. After the Second World War Apostolski became one of the military leaders of new SFRY and since 1967 to 1983 he became President of the Macedonian Academy for Science and Art in Yugoslav Macedonia . In 1995 the Military Academy in the new Republic of Macedonia was named "Mihajlo Apostolski".[5]

Mihajlo Apostolski is  a similar  case of the Greek "Akronauplia" when  twenty-seven high-ranking communistic cadres were released by the Gernlans in June 1941 from the Akronauplia prison camp, where they were under detention by the Greek authorities. They owed their release to the intervention of the Bulgarian embassy in Athens. They too declared Bulgarian nationality, although a few like Andrcas Tzimas or Samariniotis who later played a key role in political developments, were not Slav Macedonian. Most of them came from the districts of Kastoria and Florina, and included some of the protagonists in the events to be described below:

Lazaros Adamopoulos or Danios of Oinoi (Kastoria)

Lazaros Zisiadis or Trpovski of Dendrochori (Kastoria),

Zisis Kallimanis of Kalochori (Kastoria),

Theodoros Euthynuadis of Kastoria,

Anastasios Karatzas of Dendrochori,

Zisis Delios or Batzios of Kalochori,

Kyriakos Pylnis of Xynon Neron (Flonna),

Lanipros Moschos of Dendrochori,

L:lnipros Roukas of Ieropig (Kastoria),

Dianlantis Tsistinas or

Dalis of Kastoria, Andreas Tsipas of Agios I'nnteleimon (Florina)

and Lazaros Bozinis of Aposkepos (Kastoria)

More informations fo the "Akronauplia" in the book of John Koliopoulos with the title "Plundered Loyalities". 

Apostolski case is a historical fact that the Slavic population of the FYROM has changed its national identity four times during the 20th century, wavering from Bulgarian to Serbian to Bulgarian to "Macedonian," the insistence of Skopje not to give up its "Macedonian" identity feeds increasingly Athens' suspicions that Skopje's end goal is the eventual claim of all Macedonian territories (Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania). For more than 18 years Skopje has done all possible to maintain its "Macedonian" identity and increasingly forces the issue through speeches or deeds of its governments, blaming Greece for all the ills of the FYROM society, as if it is a spoiled child in a tantrum.

[1]- Dimitre Minchev (Military Publishing House, Sofia, 2002) Bulgarian Camagne Committees in Macedonia - 1941, Shtip, July 23, 1941, Document № 41. 

[2]-Македонизмът и съпротивата на Македония срещу него Коста Църнушанов, Унив. изд. "Св. Климент Охридски", София, 1992, стр. 179 

[3]-A request from Mite Apostolov Matovski, father of Mihail Apostolski. 

[4]-Bulgarian Central Military Archives (CMA), fund 20, list 4, file 25. 

[5]-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mihajlo_Apostoloski

COMMUNISM’s PIVOTAL ROLE IN THE “MACEDONIAN” ETHNOGENESIS

by  George C. Papavizas

When I was thirteen years old I asked my grandfather Constantine why he had joined the Greek andartes (freedom fighters) in Macedonia in 1904-1908 during the Macedonian Struggle and fought against the armed Slavic bands (komitadjides, committee men) of the clandestine Bulgarian Komitet " Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization" (IMRO) (Vatreshna Makedonska Revolutsionna Organizacija, VMRO in Skopje). Looking at me straight in the eyes for a long time in silence, twirling his long moustache, his sixty-year-old weather-beaten face furrowed in deep pain because of the distortion of historical facts on Macedonia emanating from the Slavic north, he said softly: "To make certain that after the Turks, our Macedonia remains Hellenic and my children and grandchildren enjoy freedom as Hellinomakedones"(Greek Macedonians). He died of pneumonia at sixty, leaving behind a deep feeling of patriotism for all and an indelible, life-long Hellenic Macedonian legacy that has had a major impact on me, his first grandson.

Sixty years later I was at my son´s house for Thanksgiving dinner. Before I sat down, my eight-year-old grandson, Aidan, ran to me and brandished the Scholastic Atlas of the World, published by Miles Kelly Publishing Ltd. in England. He proudly demonstrated his geography skills by naming several countries around the world, leaving his best at the end, the map of Greece. He looked at it for a few seconds, placed his finger on the word "Macedonia," looked at me with his intelligent blue eyes, and said: Here Papou (grandfather); I know where Macedonia is, where you were born." Suddenly, he looked at me again and said disappointed: "But you told me you were born in Macedonia, Greece."

I was not surprised that the word "Macedonia" was not on Hellenic Macedonia, but on Vardarska Banovina (also known as Vardar Province, or South Serbia), a small country beyond Greece´s northern frontier. It was not the first time that my Macedonia, the only one that existed when I was born, was not shown on the map. The publisher did not bother to place the word "Macedonia" on Hellenic Macedonia, which occupies 75% of King Philip´s historic Macedonia. I left by son´s house angry with myself for having become apathetic to my Hellenic Macedonian legacy bequeathed to me by my grandfather, suddenly revived by my grandson. Because I have learned all my life to attribute the written word with more weight than the spoken one (verba volant, scripta manent), I decided there and then to write about a plundered Macedonian legacy; how the international community has been ensnared in clever political-historical inaccuracies on the Macedonian issue, emanated or broadcast from capitals behind the Iron Curtain in the past; from free capitals north of the Greek frontier now; and how Greece´s northern neighbors, have been striving to convince the world to recognize their small break-away republic with a name that belongs to my children´s and grandchildren´s Macedonian legacy.

Why is the name "Macedonia" so important?

Because it carries along important derivatives, far beyond what it says: history, identity, heritage, culture, heroes, customs, traditions, etc. It carries "Ghosts or real historical demons. Perhaps war or peace. Nothing and everything," wrote Leslie H. Gelb in The New York Times June 12, 1992. The name, of course, is Macedonia, the land of Philip, Alexander and Aristotle; the beautiful land with Mount Olympus and the Greek Gods. The rich land east and west of the bustling city of Thessaloniki with the archaeological sites of an age long gone, the Hellenic Macedonian age: Pella, Vergina (Aegae), Dion, Amphipolis, Methone, Pydna, Olynthos, Orestis, Appolonia, Philippi, Potidaea, Stagira (Aristotle´s birthplace), Thessaloniki. Do any of these historical city names sound Slavic to the reader?

Because people around the world, after communism was entrenched in the Balkans, dispute the Hellenism of the ancient Macedonians who lived in these cities; and because the words "Macedonia" and "Macedonians" are both perceived and used nowadays as propulsive forces to create and sustain — with heavy-handedness — a new ethnic model with the name "Macedonia", forcefully embedded within the glorious Macedonian past, it is important that we understand the meaning of the so-called Macedonian Question (and the struggle for Macedonia). What was the Macedonian Question? From 1870 to 1918, it was the problem of who had the historical, cultural, ethnic, and demographic rights to rule Macedonia following the simmering demise of the Ottoman Empire. The problem triggered a political and military struggle under the Turks between Hellenism and Bulgarism, two ideas — and two forces that fought embodied as Greeks and Bulgarians — not as Greeks and "Macedonians". From 1870 to 1943, Bulgarism represented Slavism, not Macedonianism. The Slavic Macedonianism was not known as an independent ethnic concept. It was borne in the early 1940s. Bulgaria lost the struggle because it disregarded Hellenism´s deep roots in Macedonia.

With the onset of communism in the Balkans, the Macedonian Question — and the struggle for Macedonia — took on a different meaning and dangerous new dimensions. At the risk of being considered a polemic anticommunist, I must now lay considerable stress on international communism being greatly responsible for the revival and perpetuation of the Macedonian controversy since the early 1920s. And here is how and why: As early as 1921, the Soviets had inaugurated a policy, conceived by Leon Trotsky and commissar Dimitri Manuilski, to accomplish a Balkan fragmentation. The Sixth Congress of the Balkan Communist Federation under the leadership of the Bulgarian communist Kolarov and the Fifth Congress of Comintern (Communist International), an adjunct of the Soviet foreign policy, held concurrently in Moscow in 1923, voted for the formation of an "Autonomous and Independent Macedonia and Thrace."

The pre-Tito Yugoslav communist leaders, who voted against the Soviet plan, were not ready to embrace the idea of a separate Macedonian nation, insisting that the inhabitants of the Vardar Province "lacked a clearly defined national Macedonian character of their own." Ironically, it was Tito later who used the label "Macedonian" to create the new nationality, contrasting his "Macedonians" with the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians.

The communist state-controlled "Macedonian" ethnogenesis began in earnest on August 1, 1941 with Comintern, Stalin´s right-hand-instrument, dispatching the following directive to the Bulgarian and Yugoslav communist leaders (from Tsola Dragojceva, 1979): Macedonia must be attached to Yugoslavia for practical reasons and for the sake of expediency. The two parties must take up the stand of the self-determination of the Macedonian people." Ignoring Greece, Comintern decisively shifted the burden and responsibility of how to contact the struggle for Macedonia from Bulgaria to Yugoslavia and ruled for an "Independent Macedonia and Thrace" under Yugoslav hegemony. But it is doubtful that the Yugoslav and Bulgarian communists ever deluded themselves into believing they were fighting on history´s right side.

It was the Comintern directive that signaled the second phase of the Macedonian Question. For the 1940s, it was the competing claims by Greece´s communist neighbors for Hellenic Macedonia. The Bulgarians first, and the Yugoslavs later, have used every means available to them to violate the Treaty of Bucharest (signed in 1913): seditious propaganda, distortion of history, anthropological and historical studies of dubious or prejudiced nature that never considered the existence of millions of Greek Macedonians; and, indirectly, civil war (aiding the Greek communists during the civil war of 1946-1949). Greek Macedonia was ravaged during the civil war, fomented and fueled by communist Albania, communist Bulgaria and especially communist Yugoslavia to which Skopje belonged.

It was not a coincidence that the revival of the Macedonian controversy went hand in hand with communism´s genesis in the Balkans. Any doubts concerning communism´s forceful involvement with the problem would have been dissipated early in the game were it known that Comintern was involved from its early inception with the Macedonian Question.

In spite of overwhelming evidence of international communism´s involvement with the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949, most historians disregard altogether the important connection of the civil war´s destinies with those of Macedonia´s fate. Most of the modern authors who write in English do not even mention the Greek Civil War. They also neglect to mention how the Macedonian controversy was exploited by Soviet-sponsored communism to propel into the world the unhistorical concept that the Slavs, Albanians, and Bulgarians of Tito´s Socialist Republic of Macedonia were the only legitimate "Macedonians." The connection of the two issues did not escape the attention of the historian Evangelos Kofos (1995) who wrote: ". . . . the fate of Macedonia and the course of the [communist] revolution in Greece — would converge, interact, and shape the destinies of both."

My new book, CLAIMING MACEDONIA: The Struggle for the Heritage, Territory and Name of the Historic Hellenic Land, is a debate about the Macedonian history and legacy, and its plundering by the early dynamism and the theoretical base of international communism, with the Soviet Union looming awesome behind the scenes. It is the "antidote to historical illiteracy" (from TIME, July 2006) on Macedonia, especially during the period from the early 1920s to the late 1940s. Specifically, it shows the misconceptions pertaining to the fabricated legacy of Macedonia´s past, as promulgated by international communism; analyzes communism´s pivotal role in fueling the Greek Civil War and the Macedonian controversy; and emphasizes the infrastructure of the Macedonian controversy and the part of Macedonian history that now lies in dead communism´s shadow and in Tito´s defunct socialist imperialism. The critical role played by Yugoslav communism in the struggle for Macedonia, especially during the Greek Civil War, did not escape the attention of Ivo Banak, professor of history at Yale, who wrote in 1992: "only communism could provide the theoretical base and the necessary force to push for a separate "Macedonian nation."

Looking now at this backdrop from a cool historical perspective, we must ask: How did Tito and Yugoslavia manage to create a new ethnicity from a polyglot conglomerate of Slavs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Romanians, gypsies, Turks, and others and convince the world that his methods and reasons for forging a new nationality were internationally sanctionable?

The answer to these questions is simple: Using Stalin´s advice (or directive?) how to form a new nation, Tito created a "Macedonian nation" in three steps and in such a clever way that the world, including Greece next door, did not question the deeds of the World War II hero while the war was going on in Europe: First, Tito converted a part of Vardar Province to People´s Republic of Macedonia within the Yugoslav federation, using the geographic name "Macedonia" as an ethnic name; second, he created an artificial nationality by transforming the Slavs of the new republic to "Macedonians." and third, he gave the people in the new republic a new language by modifying their Bulgarian dialect and calling it "Macedonian;"

In contrast to Alexander´s language which had a Greek alphabet, the language spoken in Skopje did not have an alphabet before 1945. Tito commissioned the linguist Blaze Koneski who modified the Serbian version of the Cyrillic alphabet and called it "Macedonian alphabet." He then cleansed the language of specific Bulgarian glossic elements betraying their Bulgarian origin, replacing them by "Macedonian" neologisms; and fabricated the lexicon of the new language from a mixture of words from the Bulgarian, Serb, Croat, Slovenian and other Slavonic languages. The new artificial mixture is now called "Macedonian language."

With the Germans still in Yugoslavia, the first Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) at the monastery of Prohor Pcinjsky gave the final thrust to Tito´s grandiose plans for a unified Macedonia under Yugoslavia´s hegemony by proclaiming "Macedonia as a federated state in the Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia" and declaring: 

"You [the "Macedonians"] will succeed to unite all parts of Macedonia that the Balkan imperialists [Bulgarians, Greek, Serbs] occupied in 1913 and 1918." With these words, the Macedonian Question was revived stronger than ever, with the struggle for Macedonia assuming dangerous dimensions for the stability of the Balkans."

Let us now talk briefly about the crude communist manipulations to achieve the conversion. Ethnologically, the new republic was always a fluid country inhabited by several ideologically contentious groups with ties to Albania, Bulgaria, or Serbia. The 1940 official Yugoslav census recognized only two ethnic groups in the Vardar Province, Slavs at 66 percent and Muslims at 31 percent. In 1946, three years after the formation of the People´s Republic of Macedonia, the Slavs magically disappeared from the census that showed 66 percent "Macedonians." Was this remarkable transformation process a massive genetic mutation of the Slavic population or a census falsification?

Giorgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian communist leader, upset with Tito´s manipulations and imperialism, wrote in his diary:

 "Are we talking about a Macedonian nation or a Macedonian population made up of Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs? Does a Macedonian nation exist, and if so, where and how? Can Macedonia exist as a separate state or find freedom and statehood within the South Slav federation, regardless of the ethnic conglomerate of which it is composed" ? 

(Kouzinopoulos 1999, from Dimitrov´s secret Diary, p. 21)

Dimitrov wrote on the same page: 

"Tito´s interest and the interest of the [Skopjan] chauvinists focuses not only on Pirin Macedonia . . . . but also on the Aegean Macedonia, i.e., Greek Macedonia, and the Aegean Sea."

Now, let us return to Stalin. What was his advice (or I should say directive?) on how to create a "Macedonian Nation?" Stalin met with Soviet, Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders. When Dimitrov expressed additional doubts on the Macedonianism of the Vardar Province´s inhabitants, Stalin rushed to explain to him how state building—even if it is a fabrication—leads to acceptable nation building. His remarks to Dimitrov on nation building were revealing indeed:

Pirin Macedonia must become autonomous within a South Slav Federation.¼ Whether there is a Macedonian nation or not, and whether its population has not yet developed a Macedonian consciousness, makes no difference. Such consciousness did not exist in Byelorussia either when, after the October revolution, we proclaimed it as a Soviet republic.

In spite of Stalin´s admiration for Tito (before the split), the Soviet leader became enraged with the Yugoslav leadership´s irredentist plans. On January 10, 1945, Stalin characterized as ill-advised Tito´s efforts to incorporate into Yugoslavia not only the Greek Macedonia, but also Albania, and slices from Austria and Hungary. "I do not like their [Yugoslav] behavior . . . . they do not understand in Belgrade." (Dimitrov´s Diary, p. 22).

I have now a few serious conceptual questions on the history of the Slavic society lying in the shadow of Tito´s dead imperialism and in Comintern´s manipulations and intrigue. First, what characteristics (historical, cultural, genetic, linguistic, ethnic, or anthropological) do the people of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (now FYROM) possess to be described as "Macedonians by communist first?" Second, if the slavophones in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia were really Macedonians, why did they not assert their Macedonian identity before a communist dictator officially transformed them to "Macedonians?" And third, what are the indigenous Greek-speaking inhabitants of Greek Macedonia whose forebears always lived in Macedonia, and whose Macedonian history, civilization, culture, myths, heroes, language, all go back for countless generations? Or to put it in a different context: Which of the two groups, Hellenes or Slavs in Macedonia, is historically, culturally, linguistically, and ethnically more likely to be identified as Macedonian?

To put the state-controlled "Macedonian" ethnogenesis in proper perspective, we also need to go back to 1870 and trace the origin and sentiments of the FYROM slavophones. They underwent several transformations before their final ethnic conversion to "Macedonians": They were Bulgarians from 1870 to 1913; South Slavs or serbianized Slavs from 1913 till the German army occupied Yugoslavia in 1941; Bulgarians again proudly brandishing Bulgarian flags during the occupation of South Serbia by the fascist Bulgarian army (a Hitler gift to Bulgaria for joining Nazi Germany during World War II); Yugoslav communist partisans during the occupation; and then communist "Macedonians" by 1943 with new roots, history and language;

Upon the passing of Tito´s epoch, centered as it was on the "inherent megalomaniac charisma of a single man," they finally became reformed communist "Macedonians" in FYROM, harboring irredentist aspirations at their neighbors´ expense; hanging maps on school walls depicting Greek Macedonia occupied by Greece, a powerful irredentist stimulus and a violation of the Interim Accord; inculcating in the young´s minds the idea to hate the Greeks; revising their original constitution to include an appeal to the slavophones of Greece to continue their struggle for union with Skopje, an inclusion implying a camouflaged threat against Greece´s territorial integrity; circulating in FYROM and abroad maps depicting "Greater Macedonia" with slices of eastern Albania, southwestern Bulgaria, and northern Greece (equal to 1/4 of the Greek mainland, including Thessaloniki); or demanding on the Internet that Greek Macedonia be returned to its proper owner! The post-1991 situation in FYROM with the school maps and other pronouncements has created dangerous nationalistic ideas in young generations that have been exposed to the education system established by the reformed communist leaders following FYROM´s independence in 1991.

Considering all the facts, including the ethnic transformations, and the aggressive propaganda by Skopje and the Slavic diaspora, history has now reached the absurd and untenable points where a small mountainous enclave calling itself "Republic of Macedonia" may not only demand — by the power of its apprehended name— to be a Macedonia, but the only Macedonia; and its Slavic people may not only demand — by the power granted to them by a dictator — to be some Macedonians, but the only Macedonians.

After all these happenings, the Macedonian Question is no longer seen as a question. It has become a clever and deliberate attempt to absorb slowly, but surely, everything that belongs to a neighbor: a complete sweep of historical and archaeological values and a destruction of the neighbor´s identity and pride.

Calling the inhabitants of FYROM "Macedonians," complying with their unhistorical demands, will automatically deprive three million Hellenic Macedonians, half of whom are indigenous Hellenic Macedonians, of their Macedonian name and identity. This serious argument has nothing to do with the glorious Macedonian kings, the ancient Macedonian Hellenism, the 3,000 years of Macedonian history, or the Hellenistic Era. It has to do with the fact that the FYROM Slavs monopolize a name that people next door are using for ages. It has a lot to do with the Hellenic Macedonian´s identity arbitrarily being transferred to the FYROM Slavs fifteen years ago. It has also to do with the fact that a country (FYROM) that forms a small part of a larger whole country — less than15% of Philip´s historic Macedonia — portrays itself as representing the entire Macedonia. To quote a phrase from the book Macedonia, a Greek Term in Modern Usage (published in 2005 by the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle Foundation), "At a time when regions in Europe are searching for and pushing their distinctive identities to the fore, how can it be possible for the Greek Macedonians to lose theirs?" The Greek people must realize, if they have not done so already, that manipulations in politics, domestic and foreign, weigh heavier than the glorious historical pages of the Macedonian history and the Hellenic Macedonian romantic nationalism.

FYROM´s dogma proclaims now on all levels — political, scientific, educational, diplomatic, media — that the entire geographic area of Macedonia, down to Mount Olympus, constitutes "ethnic Macedonian territory," the homeland of the "Macedonian nation," which was unfairly partitioned in 1913 with the Treaty of Bucharest; and the homeland of the "Macedonian" people who consider the Greeks and Bulgarians as foreigners. Unfortunately, the official Greek side has not cleverly used these arguments to justify the legitimate position why Greece possesses an age-old de facto right on the name "Macedonian" and its derivatives. "Who steals my purse steals trash; but he that filches from me my good name robs of that which not enriches him, and makes me poor indeed."

Why does Skopje insist on maintaining the simple name "Republic of Macedonia," despite the fact it occupies less than 15% of historic Macedonia?

 Why did FYROM reject Matthew Nimetz´s 2005 proposal for the name Republic of Macedonia-Skopje, tentatively accepted by the Greek government as a basis for further negotiations

Nimetz, the U.N. mediator, included the following in his report to the U. N .Council. "... the name "Macedonia" has importance to a long association with the heritage, culture and history of the Hellenic Republic and Hellenic people since antiquity; "Macedonia" is a name commonly used to refer to a region of northern Greece, and that the people of that region, within the Hellenic Republic, customarily are referred to as "Macedonians." . . . Skopje must acknowledge that there is a region in Greece named "Greek Macedonia" [and not "Aegean Macedonia" or Egejska Makedonija)." 

Is it the fact that Nimetz bluntly told the Skopjans of the existence of another, older and larger Macedonia, the Hellenic Macedonia, that forced them to reject his proposed name? 

Or is it because FYROM intends to adhere to a name that does not include restrictive qualifiers which will imply extirpation of Skopje´s dreams for future territorial expansion?

It Greece were to succumb to pressure by friends and foes alike and accept the neighbor with the name "Macedonia," it would automatically condone Skopje´s aspirations, tacitly legitimizing its expansionist dreams, transforming the new state into a future territorial threat to one of Greece´s most precious territories. Granting the name "Macedonia" to Skopje would also imply future rights on the entire geographic Macedonia, thus giving the power to the new state to raise claims on a much wider territory with the name "Macedonia" and all its derivatives. Adoption of the name "Macedonia" by Skopje constitutes another equally serious threat to Greece, a threat to its national identity and cultural heritage. What does that mean? It means that monopolizing the name inadvertently will lead to a Slavic monopoly of everything Macedonian: history, civilization, culture, identity, heroes, customs, symbols, arts, traditions. Failing to preserve the cultural-historical heritage is tantamount for Greece to failing to keep alive what I call in my new book, The power of Hellenic Macedonian ethnic identity, culture, and pride, three tenets (or expression if you will) defining Macedonian Hellenism.

Pushed into a difficult corner in the midst of the international Macedonian controversy, Greece must find it hard to forgive the disappointing stance of its friends and allies, who sanctioned the use of the name "Macedonia" by the small republic. The irony of the U.S. policy is that it assisted Greece to protect its territory in the 1940s, and thwart Tito´s and Stalin´s irredentist aspirations; and then, forgetting the rivers of blood spilled by the Greek people to thwart communism´s advance, turned around and recognized as "Macedonians" the people against whom Greece was fighting with America´s help to preserve its territorial integrity during the Greek Civil War.

Equally paradoxical is the fact that when the political and military pendulum swung in the opposite direction after Greece successfully repulsed Soviet-sponsored communism and prevented it from reaching the Aegean, Greece became the aggressor in the eyes of the West, as if Greece were the guilty party that usurped its neighbor´s name and assumed an identity that belonged to another country; as if Greece were the country that appropriated a foreign emblem to decorate its flag; as if Greece were the country with an irredentist constitution, claiming territories right and left, north and south; as if Greece demanded in its constitution that half of FYROM return to Greece because in the past it belonged to Philip´s and Alexander´s Macedonia.

With these perspectives in mind, the insistence of FYROM Slavs to be called "Macedonians," a name dictatorially established and supported by communism´s brutal force and theoretical base sixty years ago, clashes with the Hellenic Macedonians´ right of always being Macedonians. If FYROM considers itself Macedonia, an audaciously daring step that brings the origin of its Slavic inhabitants close to Philip and Alexander the Great, then the insistence of these contemporary people to be called "Macedonians" clashes head on with the age-old freedom of others to be called "Macedonians." FYROM has the right to survive and prosper, but according to the Academy of Athens, it does not have the right to acquire, by international recognition, an advantage enjoyed by no other state in the world: to use a name which of itself propagandizes territorial aspirations.

The Pan-Macedonian Association of America, Sixty Years of Activity.

Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia

Papercover: 252 pages
Publisher: Institute For Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1964
Author: Evangelos Kofos
Status: Rare and Out of print book

Kofos is one the few scholars with a deep knowledge of the Macedonian Question. In a question overloaded by conflicting propagandas this book is a valuable companion to separate the facts from the myths.

This work is a history of Macedonia from the early nineteenth century to 1962. As the title suggests, it concerns the internal and external struggles of the Balkan states and their respective Communist parties for control of the region. His purpose, Kofos tells us, is to correct the "distortions and inaccuracies" of most secondary works by utilizing new sources, especially Greek government archives.

The book's strong points are two: the arguments that western Macedonia was indeed predominantly Greek" and that the Balkan Communist parties have been more nationalistic than Marxist in their Macedonian policies. Actually, neither contention is startlingly original, particularly the latter. Elizabeth Barker's Macedonia (1950) proved this conclusively, and Kofos relies heavily on her work. He has, however, added detailed information, much of which has hitherto been unavailable in English, for example, details of the struggles within the Greek and Yugoslav Communist parties over the Comintern's policy for an autonomous Macedonia.

Another contribution of this book is the introduction of a great body of Greek monographic studies of the last ten or fifteen years dealing with various aspects of Greco-Slavic relations. The existence of such studies is almost completely unknown in the West. In connection with sources, this reviewer feels that a critical bibliograph- ical essay discussing the Greek, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav, as well as the Macedonian sources on the subject would both enhance the value of the study and illuminate some of the problems which a student of Greco-Slavic relations faces. As Kofos admits in his introduction, "Macedonia has suffered from far too extensive a bibliography, one tending to obscure rather than clarify the real issues."

There will be those who will disagree with some of his opinions and certain appellations describing ethnic groups in Macedonia, such as Slavophobes, Greco- mans, Exarchists, etc., but this is unavoidable in treating a topic of this nature. Others will disagree with his concluding remark that as a result of the relative decline of the dispute during the last few years, "the Macedonian question can and should be considered a subject for the student of history rather than an issue for the policymaker." To assume such a possibility is to assume that the age-old conflicts on which this study is based can be removed over night. Such a cherished accomplishment will demand both political maturity and considerable sacrifice of national interests and pride. One wonders if that can be said of any of the Balkan states as yet. In an age when nationalism has proven a most disruptive force, Macedonia may still prove a bone of contention affecting the relations of the Balkan states concerned.

==========================================================

INTRODUCTION(pages 1-6)

For almost a century, the Macedonian Question has occupied a unique position in Balkan politics, unique because it is the most con­troversial issue keeping the Balkan peoples apart.

In Macedonia, as in most highly disputed lands, one hardly feels confident when trying to untangle the strings of confusion. In the endless game of politics, propaganda has been elevated to the rank of scholarship; hopes and national aspirations have assumed the form of rightful demands. A serious student of the problem, or a conscientious diplomat in the field, experiences uncertainty as to what constitutes a fact and what a myth in the Macedonian paradox.

Macedonia has suffered from far too extensive a bibliography, one tending to obscure rather than clarify the real issues. Few have been the true scholarly works. Most of the books, brochures, pamphlets and articles have been written in the heat of passion, prompted by the urge to defend or to project one side over the other. The geographic boundaries of the region, for instance, have been exposed to numerous interpretations and have caused many a scholar and propagandist to devote time and energy arguing on end over seemingly insignificant points. History, always a convenient means for converting past glories into contemporary political claims, has been twisted and recast a hundred times in order to justify individual national views. Worse yet, the analysis of the ethnological structure of Macedonia has been subjected to a savage treatment at the hands of the respective national propagandas, since it was felt, that whoever appeared to command the loyalties of the majority, enjoyed a greater chance of seeing his views enforced.

Today, however, marks a period of relative calm. The revolution­aries—known either as chauvinist comitadjis or communist guerrillas—have been withdrawn from the scene. Though propaganda war is still on, it is now strong and aggressive, now gentle and couched in diplomatic under­tones. In such a tranquil respite this study was undertaken hoping to shed a little more light on a complex issue; weigh a little more soberly the events which shook this part of the world in recent years, and draw — if possible—the proper conclusions in order to better comprehend the elements and motivations which tend to bring the Macedonian issue con­stantly to the foreground.

* * *

The Macedonian Question has been a combination of age-old national antagonisms, messianic ambitions, Great Power politics, racial suspicions, economic considerations and, more recently, conflicting socio-political ideologies.

Initially, it commenced as a typical example of a national awakening of neighboring peoples, only it soon manifested itself in an unbridled urge for territorial expansion, sometimes justified, more often not. At the same time, the geopolitical value of the region attracted the attention of the Great Powers who tended to complicate the issue and accentuate local antagonisms by espousing now one, now the other of the Balkan peoples.

The peace treaties which ended the Balkan wars and the First World War, settled the issue juridically. The population transfers of the first two decades of the 20th century, reduced, to some extend, the importance of the ethnological aspect of the problem. Yet, other considerations con­tinued to keep it alive. Among them were economic interests, as expressed in Bulgarian efforts for a territorial outlet in the Aegean Sea; group pres­sures, like the case of the Bulgarian Macedonian refugees in Bulgaria agitating for return to their native villages in Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia; and ir­responsible actions by the various dictators who had come to power in the Balkan states during the inter-war period and who tended to act impulsively on whatever concerned Macedonia. Finally, the emergence of communism in the Balkans was instrumental in reviving and accentuating the old con­troversy.

* * *

Before anyone proceeds with a study of this problem, it is important that certain bacic facts are well taken into consideration.Macedonia is neither a geographical nor a national entity. For the past fifty years it has remained, above all, a political problem which from time to time, emerges with varied degrees of acuteness. A land of high moun­tains and fertile plains, traversed by wide but unnavigable rivers which follow a general southerly direction, it occupies the most important eco­nomic and strategic location in Southeastern Europe. Its natural and con-fortable harbors of Thessaloniki and Kavala, on the Aegean, can stimu­late the trade of the entire peninsula; they can also provide excellent ac­cess to the interior of the Balkans for military operations and, indeed, theyhave. Its plains which cut the monotony of southern Balkan mountain ranges constitute the granary not only for Macedonia but for the surround­ing regions as well; yet, these same plains have been over the ages the main gateways for invaders coming to pillage and conquer. Valuable com­mercial routes traverse Macedonia linking Greece with Central Europe and the Orient with the West; but, again, these same routes have been an end­less temptation to old and new imperialist-minded powers. In the present international situation, Macedonia constitutes the most tempting — and vul­nerable— region in the North Atlantic defense complex. In the event of a major confrontation between the two blocs it bars a descent of the Soviets toward the Mediterranean, at the same time remaining a valuable forward base for the Western Alliance. Thus, since Macedonia excels in paradoxes, it is no surprise that whatever appears to be a God-sent gift, is frequent­ly an unwarranted anathema.

Today the commonly accepted boundaries of Macedonia follow the administrative divisions of the respective Macedonian provinces in Greece, Yugoslavia and, to some extent, in Bulgaria. In the north, they follow the direction of the Shar Mountains and the hills north of Skopje; in the east they move along the Rila and Rhodope Mountain ranges and, inside Greece, along the Nestos River. The southern limits begin at the mouth of the Nestos, and follow the coastline to the slopes of Mount Olympus and thence, to the edge of the Pindus range. There, they take a sharp northerly direction, forming the western boundary with the lakes of Pres-pa and Ohrid as focal points.The periphery of Macedonia crosses four national boundaries enter­ing only briefly into Albania in the region of the lakes. Greek Macedonia occupies 51.56 per cent of the area, or 34,602,5 square kilometers; Yugo­slav Macedonia 38.32 per cent or 25,713 square kilometers and Bulga­rian Macedonia 10.12 per cent or 6,789,2 square kilometers. [1]

It is fruitless to trace the boundaries of Macedonia throughout the ages. Yugoslavs and Bulgarians generally agree on the delimitation as pre­sented above, although at times, for political reasons, they tend to exclude certain districts of southern Greek Macedonia. The Greeks, on the other hand, do not accept the northern demarcation, contending that it was drawn arbitrarily on the basis of Ottoman administrative divisions rather, than on historical tradition. Instead, they limit the geographical region of Macedonia to the confines of the old Macedonian state of classical times. According to their view, present-day Greek Macedonia, and only certain narrow belts north of the border in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, can be rightly referred to by the name "Macedonia." Consequently, when the Yugo­slavs talk of a "Macedonian" state in their country —for that matter, a "Macedonian" state of Slavs — the Greeks feel that their neighbors are ma­nipulating arbitrarily a name and a state which rightfully belongs to their own classical heritage.
Today, Greek Macedonia is divided into three geographical regions, i.e. Eastern Macedonia, comprising the towns of Serres, Drama and the port of Kavala, Central Macedonia with Thessaloniki, and Western Ma­cedonia whose major towns are Kastoria, Fiorina, Kozani and Edessa. Administratively, it is divided into twelve nomoi or prefectures, each with a prefect appointed by the Government. Thessaloniki is the capital of Ma­cedonia and the seat of the Minister of Northern Greece who has the rank of a full cabinet minister and whose jurisdiction extends over Thrace as well as Macedonia.Since 1944, Yugoslav Macedonia has been known as the People's Republic of Macedonia, [2] one of the six federative republics of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Skopje, a city of approximately 170,000 [3] inhabitants, is the capital of the region and the seat of the local govern­ment and assembly. Administratively it is composed of seven departments,!.e. Bitola (Monastir), Kumanovo, Ohrid, Skopje, Stip, Tetovo and TitovVeles.

At present, the regions which comprise what was traditionally known as Bulgarian "Pirin" Macedonia, are the Prefecture of Blagoevgrad and the district of Kiunstendil in the new (1959) Prefecture of Stanke Dimitrov. The Prefecture of Blagoevgrad comprises six administrative districts: Blagoevgrad, Goce Delcev, Petric\ Razlog and Sandaski. In addition there are the town-districts of Bansko and Melnik.The Macedonian provinces in Greece and Bulgaria are fully integrated in the respective countries with no separate status. Only Yugoslav Mace­donia, for reasons which will be analyzed in due course, has a type of autonomy as a federated component of Yugoslavia. There is no communion between the three parts of Macedonia. In fact, there is more dividing them than uniting them, the only exception being the relationship between Bulgarian and Yugoslav Macedonia whose common historical past and racial kinship tend to bring them together. Yet, even in their case, poli­tical considerations influence their orientation more effectively than his­torical ties.

Today, Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia are ethnically homogeneous regions. In Greek Macedonia, according to the latest official figures, there are 1,700,835 inhabitants of whom 41,017 are classified as Slav-speaking. In Bulgarian Macedonia (Prefecture of Blagoevgrad only), according to the 1956 census there were 281,015 inhabitants of whom 187,789 were classified as ethnic "Macedonians." At present, although the results of the 1961-1962 census have not been published, all inhabitants are con­sidered as ethnic Bulgarians. Yugoslav Macedonia is a different case. Since 1944, a "Macedonian" nationality has been recognized by the com­munist regime, and all the inhabitants of the region —known until that time as Serbs or Bulgarians—are termed "Macedonians." According to 1961 official estimates, the population of Yugoslav Macedonia is 1,404,000. [4]

It is not for this introductory section to try to examine in detail the merits of the argument over the question of the existence of a "Macedo­nian" nationality. It is only hoped that in subsequent pages this point —as well as a score of others —will emerge a little more clearly.

* * *

The present book is divided into two parts. Part One, which is based on secondary sources, has been included mostly as an introduction for the uninitiated reader and as a basis for allowing for intelligent com­parisons. Briefly, it reviews the "old" Macedonian Question, as it devel­oped from the time of its 19th century awakening of nationalities to the Second World War when Bulgaria, allied to Nazi Germany, appeared to have come close to realizing her century-old aspirations of occupying the entire region. Part Two, which is far more extensive and brings to light previously unpublished data, deals with the role of communism in the shaping of the "new" Macedonian Question. It begins with a return to the first decades of this century, when the Bolsheviks began to consider the potentialities of the Macedonian issue for the advancement of their own objectives in the Balkans; it ends at the time of this writing when tensions are considerably low on all sides.

References

[1]-Figures for the Greek and Bulgarian Macedonian regions are taken from Christopher S. Christides, The Macedonian Camouflage in the Light of Facts and Figures (Athens: The Hellenic Publishing Company, 1949), p. 53, and for Yugoslav Macedonia from Petit Manuel de la Yougoslavie, 1962 (Belgrade: Federal Institute of Statistics, 1962), p. 20.

[2]-In April 1963, Yugoslavia and her republics replaced the "People's Repu­blic" by the "Socialist Republic." Since the present book deals with events prior to this change, the old name will be retained.

[3]-Petit Manuel de la Yougoslavie, 1962, op. cit., p. 121.

[4]-4. Ibid., p. 20. The 1953 official statistics gave a more detail breakdown for the population of the " P.R. of Macedonia: "

"Macedonians"...............861,000
Turks ..............................204,000
Skipitars (Albanians) ....163,000
Serbs ..................................35,000
Gypsies ..............................20,000
Vlachs ..................................9,000
Croats ..................................3,000
Montenegrins .....................3,000
Yugoslavs (various) ...........2,000
Greeks .................................1,000
Bulgarians ...........................1,000
Slovenians ...........................1,000
Russians ..............................1,000
Undesignated .....................1,000
Total .............................1,305,000

Source : Federal Statistical Institute : Statistical Year-book of Yugoslavia, 1959 (Belgrade, April 1959), p. 23.

FOR FAIR USE ONLY