Nationalist IMRO versus Federalist IMRO (1924-1934)

Bulgaria had other problems to deal with in the interwar years. Peas­ant unrest and internal collapse caused by the 'national catastrophe' of 1918 brought into office Alexandur Stamboliiski, leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU). The Agrarian premier diverged sharply from his predecessors in both foreign and domestic policies, bold­ly stated in the Bulgarian Subranie (Assembly) that he was neither Bulgar­ian nor Serbian but South Slav, and tried to reach a modus vivendi with the Yugoslavs.

Stamboliiski's policy provoked the wrath of a revived IMRO, which intensified its raids into Yugoslav territory in a desperate effort to keep the Macedonian Question open. IMRO was led at that time by Todor Alexandrov, greatly admired by the Bulgar-Macedonians, who affectionately called him Stario (Old Man); he favoured autonomy for the area, but, had this solution been rendered impossible, Macedonia could have been placed under the protection of a Great Power, perhaps Britain. Alexandrov himself was given the chance to bring that solu­tion—and himself—to the attention of international opinion by giving an interview to the London Times on 1 January 1924.

The Nis Convention between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, signed in May 1923, was the last straw for IMRO. The convention provided strict fron­tier control to prevent bands from entering Yugoslav territory. A month later Stamboliiski was overthrown by a coup in which IMRO played an active part. IMRO's men, gifted practitioners of the art of sensational killing, assassinated him, after staging a macabre theatre: they cut off his ears and nose, ridiculed him, forced him to dig his own grave, and did not neglect to cut off the 'hand that signed the Nis Convention'.


After Stamboliiski's execution, political agitations, anarchy, and IMRO's terrorism increased in Bulgaria, with IMRO stepping up its terrorist raids into Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia in 1923. Southwest Bulgaria was prac­tically in IMRO's hands. But it was eventually worn out by internal friction among autonomists, annexationists, and new IMRO communists, a condi­tion that eventually degenerated into an internal civil war. More than four hundred people died from 1924 to 1934. The 1934 one-year dictatorship established by progressive intellectuals dealt such a heavy blow to IMRO that it never really recovered.

In the wake of severe pressures by emerging Balkan strategic alliances and the Soviet Union's blatant interference with the Macedonian Question, IMRO approached the Soviet Union, the Balkan communist parties, and rival forces within the Bulgarian committees (Federalists, etc.). After hard negotiations, IMRO's Central Committee declared that its aim was the formation of an independent Macedonia within a union of Balkan demo­cratic states, a sharp departure from its pre-World War I autonomy-for-Macedonia platform, and this goal could only be realized with the cooperation of all the Balkan people and the "progressive" forces. Further negotiations between IMRO's Alexandrov and CPB's Kolarov sealed the agreement and "wiped out" the differences between the CPB and the nationalist IMRO on Macedonia's future. From 1924 to 1927, the ultranationalist IMRO had practically become another Soviet Union satellite without a country.

Within the framework of the decisions of Comintern's Fifth Congress was also the decision to win over IMRO in the struggle for Macedonian autonomy. BCF did not have to work hard for this. Considerable coopera­tion already existed between Comintern's and BCF's communist leaders with the nationalist IMRO. Notwithstanding their ideological differences, the common goal for autonomy or independence of Macedonia tied the three organizations together, impelling them to cooperate. The extreme ethnic Macedonian views of IMRO's leaders did not contradict Comintern's long-term Balkan policies. Moreover, both Comintern and BCF needed IMRO's strong arm and its penchant for terrorism in the field .

Peas­ant unrest and internal collapse caused by the 'national catastrophe' of 1918 brought into office Alexandur Stamboliiski, leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU).90 The Agrarian premier diverged sharply from his predecessors in both foreign and domestic policies, bold­ly stated in the Bulgarian Subranie (Assembly) that he was neither Bulgar­ian nor Serbian but South Slav, and tried to reach a modus vivendi with the Yugoslavs.91 Stamboliiski's policy provoked the wrath of a revived IMRO, which intensified its raids into Yugoslav territory in a desperate effort to keep the Macedonian Question open.92 IMRO was led at that time by Todor Alexandrov, greatly admired by the Bulgar-Macedonians, who affectionately called him Stario (Old Man); he favoured autonomy for the area, but, had this solution been rendered impossible, Macedonia

From 1924 onwards IMRO established a state-within-a-state in the south-western part of Bulgaria, around the districts of Kiustendil and Petrich. Its control over the district was complete and indisputable. IMRO had its own police, controlled the local representatives to the Subranie, and issued stamps featuring the founding fathers and chiefs of the organization, notably the legendary IMRO leader Gotse Delchev. Even the personal life of the peasants was closely watched. A single man could only walk out twice in the company of an unmarried girl. If he continued doing so, a letter from IMRO, asking for marriage or separation, would certainly prompt him to revise his tactics.

Apart from being the guardian of peasant values, however, the organization also catered for less moral pursuits: it secured a solid financial basis by imposing taxes upon the population, and engaged in drug trafficking.However after the assassination of Alexandrov in 1924, internal strife broke out between the pro-left 'Federalists' who wanted the movement to be linked with the Comintern, and the right wing of the organization.

At that time Ivan Mihailov was the champion of the latter. A man of conflicting qualities, and impatient with the Federalists, Mihailov launched a spectacular campaign of assassinations. Mencha Karnicheva, a Vlach woman from Krusevo, made her mark in this game of terror by assassinating in cold blood her former lover Todor Panitsa, a leading Federalist, at the Vienna opera. She later married Mihailov. This algebra of death continued until 1928, and counted many prominent Macedonians of every description. That year, however, after finishing with the left, Mihailov turned against the other senior IMRO figure: the ageing General Alexandur Protogerov. The respected general was assassinated in July 1928, leaving Mihailov the sole leader of the organization. From that month, and until the organization's suppression in 1934, Protogerovists and Mihailovists killed each other in the streets of Petrich and Sofia, in a fratricidal struggle that marked the decline of the organization.

Nationalism stream that later became Fascism and Federalism that later became Communism. This is one part of the story of the IMRO/VMRO.

Sources
1- Claiming Macedonia, George Papavizas, MCG, page 98
2- The Macedonian Question, Dimitris Livanios, Oxford, 2008, pages 27-27